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Abstract
The paper is concerned with two-person dynamic zero-sum games in continuous set-
ting. We investigate the limit of value functions of finite horizon games with long run
average cost as the time horizon tends to infinity and the limit of value functions of λ -
discounted games as the discount tends to zero. Under quite weak assumptions on the
game, we prove the Uniform Tauberian Theorem: existence of a uniform limit for one of
the value functions implies the uniform convergence of the other one to the same limit.
We also prove the analogs of the One-sided Tauberian Theorem, i.e., the inequalities on
asymptotics for the lower and upper games. Also, a variant of the theorem for discrete-
time games is treated separately. Special attention is devoted to the case of differential
games. The key roles in the proof were played by Bellman’s optimality principle and the
closedness of strategies under concatenation.
Keywords: Dynamic programming principle; game with zero sum; Tauberian theo-
rem; Abel mean; Cesaro mean; differential games; slowly varying function; subsolution
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Hardy once proved (see, for example, [27]) that, for a bounded sequence of numbers ai ,
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
ai = lim
λ↓0
λ
∞∑
i=1
(1− λ)i−1ai
if there exists at least one of these limits. This result was named a Tauberian theorem in
honor of the similar result obtained by Tauber for convergent series. Theorems of this kind,
in particular, provide the means for obtaining good estimates for sums of series with the use
of faster methods of summation. For a more detailed treatment of the history of those results,
see, for example, [10]. There are also Tauberian theorems for functions, in particular (see, for
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example, [26, Sect. 6.8]), for a bounded continuous function g , the limit of long run averages
and limit of discounted averages (Cesaro mean and Abel mean, respectively)
1
T
∫ T
0
g(t) dt, λ
∫ ∞
0
e−λtg(t) dt
coincide if there exists at least one of these limits.
What if we optimize the Abel mean and/or Cesaro mean and then consider the limit of
the optimal values corresponding to them? Such limit value (as the discount tends to zero)
was first considered in [11] for a stochastic formulation. As proved in [38], for a stochastic
two-person game with a finite number of states and actions, optimal long-time averages and
optimal discounted averages share the common limit. For more details on the limit value for
Abel mean and/or Cesaro mean in other stochastic formulations, see [13, 49, 50].
In the deterministic case, the question of existence of limit values arose in the control theory,
time and again; one may at the very least note [16, 21, 25, 37]. In the ergodic case (more
generally, in the nonexpansive-like case) such limits exist and, moreover, they are independent
of the initial state [2, 4, 5, 6, 7]. For the latest results on existence of the limit values (first of
all, in the nonergodic case), refer to [22, 23, 42]; see also the review in [12, Sect. 3.4]. For a
bibliography on discrete statements, refer to [43].
For control problems, the equality of limit values in the case when at least one of those limits
is constant was first proved in [3]. The very general case of dynamic system was considered in
paper [41]. Namely, it was proved there that existence of a uniform (on the set of states) limit
for the value of one of the means implies the uniform convergence for value of the other one to
the same limit. That paper also contains a beautiful introduction to the history of the subject
and a review of publications in the field. For discrete time systems, the equality of limit values
was proved earlier in [35].
Until very recently, there was only a rather small number of publications concerned with the
study of the limits of optimal averages in differential games. These are, first of all, [1, 7, 14] and,
in addition, [9, 24]. In differential games of the special kind, those limits may be connected with
the asymptotic value of zero-sum repeated games; a good discussion of this issue is presented
in [47], see [15] on Tauberian theorem for repeated games. Moreover, as noted in [41] for
differential games, “When the dynamic is controlled by two players with opposite goals, a
Tauberian theorem is given in the ergodic case by Theorem 2.1 in [1]. However, the general,
nonergodic case is still an open problem in both the discrete and the continuous settings.”
However, now, the situation has changed. Firstly, a Tauberian theorem was proposed for
differential games in nonergodic case in [31]. In [50], a very general approach to proof of
Tauberian theorem was proposed for games with two players with opposite goals in discrete
setting.
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In this paper, we show a number of uniform Tauberian theorems for dynamic two-person
games with zero sum, in particular, for differential games, for normal form games, and for
games in discrete setting. Our approach to proofs continues the ideas of [35, 38, 41]: Bellman’s
optimality principle and the closedness of strategies under concatenation. Under these circum-
stances, the specifics of a game with a saddle point (in particular, of a differential game under
Isaacs condition) allows to streamline the proof of the uniform Tauberian theorem as related to
them. Such proof reduces to the two inequalities for the lower and upper games, respectively;
following [10] and [26], we call those inequalities One-sided Tauberian theorems. After that,
the proof of One-sided Tauberian theorem boils down to the application of the suboptimality
principle to the strategy that is constructed in a special way through concatenation.
Recall that [41] provides an example showing that the Tauberian theorem for control prob-
lem may not hold if the limits are not uniform over the strongly invariant set of positions. The
condition of existence of a uniform limit in the case of Tauberian theorem for dynamic games
is certainly as significant. However, this condition may be relaxed for construction of one-sided
estimates. Firstly, in construction of such bounds, one could use any function satisfying the
corresponding Dynamic Programming Principle in place of the value function of the original
problem. Secondly, for this function, we can replace the condition of existence of the uniform
limit with the condition of slow variation (or even monotonicity).
The structure of the paper is as follows. We start by formulating the Tauberian theorems
for normal form games (Theorems 1,2) in Sect. 1. Then, we consider an axiomatic definition of
a rather general game problem statement in the framework of the dynamic model proposed in
[41] (see Sect. 2). At the same place, we formulate Theorems 3,4, the main results of this paper.
The first of these is based on the existence of a saddle point value in all the considered games,
the other one essentially requires the upper value to be greater or equal to the lower value for
all of the games. In the next Section (Sect. 3), we show the connection between the One-sided
Tauberian theorem, slowly varying functions, and suboptimality principle. Sect. 4 contains the
proofs of Theorems 3,4 and their corollaries, including (the proof of) Theorems 1,2. Sect. 5 is
devoted to Tauberian theorem (Theorem 5) for games in discrete setting. Most of the proofs
are located in Appendix. In addition, Appendix D serves to transfer the results obtained for
the abstract statement onto the case of differential games (Theorem 6).
We would like to note that Theorem 6 and Theorem 4 for more strong assumptions were
also proved in [31] and [32], respectively.
1 Normal form game with zero sum
Define T , R≥0. Assume the following items are given:
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• a nonempty set Ω ;
• a nonempty subset K of mappings from T to Ω ;
• a running cost g : Ω 7→ [0, 1]; for each process z ∈ K, assume the map t 7→ g(z(t)) is
Borel-measurable.
Let us now define concatenation on processes. Let τ ∈ T, z′, z′′ ∈ K be such that z′(τ) =
z′′(0). Then, their concatenation z′ ⋄τ z
′′ , a mapping from T to Ω, is defined by the following
rule:
(z′ ⋄τ z
′′)(t) ,
{
z′(t), t ≤ τ ;
z′′(t− τ), t > τ.
(1)
For all ω ∈ Ω , let there be given the non-empty sets L(ω),M(ω). Define sets L,M of all
selectors Ω ∋ ω → l(ω) ∈ L(ω), Ω ∋ ω → m(ω) ∈ M(ω), respectively. Let, for all ω ∈ Ω ,
each pair (l, m) ∈ L×M of players’ rules generate a unique process z[ω, l,m] ∈ K such that
z[ω, l,m](0) = ω .
Theorem 1 For all τ > 0 , assume that, for all l′, l′′ ∈ L , there exists l∗ ∈ L such that, for
all ω ∈ Ω , one has{
z[ω, l∗, m′]
∣∣m′ ∈M}={z[ω, l′, m′] ⋄τ z[ω′, l′′, m′′]∣∣∣m′, m′′ ∈M, ω′ , z[ω, l′, m′](τ) ∈Ω} ⊂ K;(2a)
moreover, for all m′, m′′ ∈ M , there exists m∗ ∈ M such that, for all ω ∈ Ω , one has{
z[ω, l′, m∗]
∣∣ l′ ∈L}={z[ω, l′, m′] ⋄τ z[ω′, l′′, m′′]∣∣∣ l′, l′′ ∈L, ω′ , z[ω, l′, m′](τ) ∈Ω} ⊂ K. (2b)
Assume also that, for each λ, T, h > 0 , ω ∈ Ω ,
V
♮
T (ω) , sup
l∈L
inf
m∈M
1
T
∫ T
0
g(z[ω, l,m](t)) dt = inf
m∈M
sup
l∈L
1
T
∫ T
0
g(z[ω, l,m](t)) dt, (3a)
W
♮
λ(ω) , sup
l∈L
inf
m∈M
λ
∫ ∞
0
e−λtg
(
z[ω, l,m](t)
)
dt = inf
m∈M
sup
l∈L
λ
∫ ∞
0
e−λtg
(
z[ω, l,m](t)
)
dt,(3b)
V
♮
T (ω) = sup
l∈L
inf
m∈M
[
1
T + h
∫ h
0
g(z[ω, l,m](t)) dt+
T
T + h
V
♮
T
(
z[ω, l,m](h)
)]
(3c)
= inf
m∈M
sup
l∈L
[
1
T + h
∫ h
0
g(z[ω, l,m](t)) dt+
T
T + h
V
♮
T
(
z[ω, l,m](h)
)]
,
W
♮
λ(ω) = sup
l∈L
inf
m∈M
[
λ
∫ h
0
e−λtg
(
z[ω, l,m](t)
)
dt+ e−λhW ♮λ
(
z[ω, l,m](h)
)]
(3d)
= inf
m∈M
sup
l∈L
[
λ
∫ h
0
e−λtg
(
z[ω, l,m](t)
)
dt+ e−λhW ♮λ
(
z[ω, l,m
]
(h)
)]
.
Then, the following limits exist, are uniform in ω ∈ Ω , and coincide
lim
T↑∞
V
♮
T (ω) = lim
λ↓0
W
♮
λ(ω) ∀ω ∈ Ω (4)
if at least one of these limits exists, and is uniform in ω ∈ Ω.
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This theorem itself will be proved in Sect. 4 as an immediate consequence of Theorem 3. In
view of that, conditions ( 2a ) , ( 2b ) express nothing more than the need to test the closedness
with respect to concatenation.
In Theorem 1, we also need a saddle point for all the games considered. This condition can
be relaxed, which will also simplify conditions ( 2a ) , ( 2b ) .
Theorem 2 Assume that, for all τ > 0 , each of the sets L and M is equipped with a binary
operation ⋄τ such that, for all l
′, l′′ ∈ L, m′, m′′ ∈ M ,
z
[
ω, l′ ⋄τ l
′′, m′ ⋄τ m
′′
]
= z[ω, l′, m′] ⋄τ z
[
z[ω, l′, m′](τ), l′′, m′′
]
∀ω ∈ Ω, (5a)
∃ l ∈ L, m ∈ M l′ ⋄τ l = l
′, m′ ⋄τ m = m
′. (5b)
If there exist the limits in
lim
T↑∞
sup
l∈L
inf
m∈M
1
T
∫ T
0
g(z[ω, l,m](t)) dt = lim
T↑∞
inf
m∈M
sup
l∈L
1
T
∫ T
0
g(z[ω, l,m](t)) dt ∀ω ∈ Ω, (6a)
in addition, these limits are uniform on Ω, and coincide, then all limits in
lim
λ↓0
sup
l∈L
inf
m∈M
λ
∫ ∞
0
e−λtg(z[ω, l,m](t)) dt = lim
λ↓0
inf
m∈M
sup
l∈L
λ
∫ ∞
0
e−λtg(z[ω, l,m](t)) dt ∀ω ∈ Ω(6b)
exist, are uniform on Ω, and coincide with the limits in ( 6a ) .
On the other hand, if limits in ( 6b ) exist, are uniform on Ω, and coincide, then the limits
in ( 6a ) exist, are uniform on Ω, and coincide with limits in ( 6b ) .
The theorem will be proved in Sect. 4. For the use of condition ( 5a ) for differential games,
refer to [31, Remark 3.2].
2 Abstract dynamic game with zero sum
Before exploring the formal definitions, let us sketch a possible interpretation of the necessary
formalizations. For stochastic games, a similar statement may be found in [45].
Assume players get some information on state at the current time, but all information on
this that is available to the players is contained in a certain signal ω ; denote the set of all
possible signals by Ω . Since the game develops with time, we can consider the set K, which
would contain all processes t 7→ ω(t) that are possible for the given game. Assume the current
value of running cost is known at every point of time and, therefore, contained in the signal,
i.e., can be described by a function that depends only on ω . Then, by virtue of the known
dependence t 7→ ω(t) , i.e., in view of the element z ∈ K , we can reconstruct the value of the
payoff function that realizes.
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Each player also may make private actions according to some rule, as a function of the
signal; in this case, there may be some restrictions on the rule’s feasibility and on the use of
information. We will only assume that the set of such feasible rules is nonempty (playable
strategy); later, we will also require the existence of ε -optimal rule for each player. For a fixed
initial signal ω , every pair of rules chosen by the players restores some processes z ∈ K with
the property z(0) = ω (in the case of the normal form games, such a process is unique). Denote
all such z by Γ(ω). On the other hand, each player has the right to publish his decision rule
in advance. This act would map to every such rule some subset of K of the various z that
agree with this rule. Exhausting all the rules, we obtain a set of such subsets, one set for each
player (A and B for the first and the second player, respectively).
If one of the players, let it be the first one, publishes his rule, with this act essentially
defining A ∈ A , let us assume that now the second player has the right to use any information
in the choice of initial ω , or rather a process z ∈ A ∩ Γ(ω) . We (at least, within Theorem 3)
are going to consider the case when mandating the publication for one of the players (discrim-
ination against this player) does not change the value that is guaranteed to him by the initial
information, i.e., when there is a saddle point in such a game.
Let us now proceed to formal definitions.
Dynamic system. Assume we are given a nonempty set Ω , a nonempty subset K of
mappings from T to Ω , and a running cost g : Ω 7→ [0, 1] such that, for each process z ∈ K,
the map t 7→ g(z(t)) is Borel-measurable. For all τ ∈ T, z′, z′′ ∈ K with z′(τ) = z′′(0), we
can define the concatenation z′ ⋄τ z
′′ : T → Ω by the rule ( 1 ) .
We would also need the set
Γ(ω) , {z ∈ K | z(0) = ω},
defined for each ω ∈ Ω . This is the set of all feasible processes z ∈ K that begin at ω .
Let us now define concatenation on subsets of K . For each pair of non-empty subsets of K
and a time τ ∈ T , define their concatenation by
A′ ⋄τ A
′′ , {z′ ⋄τ z
′′ | z′ ∈ A′, z′′ ∈ A′′, z′(τ) = z′′(0)}
= {z′ ⋄τ z
′′ | z′ ∈ A′, z′′ ∈ A′′ ∩ Γ(z′(τ))}. (7)
To get rid of excessive parentheses, let us hereinafter assume A⋄τ ′A
′ ⋄τ ′′A
′′ ,
(
A⋄τ ′A
′
)
⋄τ ′′A
′′.
Assumptions on strategies. Assume we are given a non-empty family A of subsets of
the set K . Call a subset A of the set K a playable strategy if we have A∩Γ(ω) 6= ∅ for every
initial ω ∈ Ω .
We hereinafter impose the following conditions on A :
(P) A is some non-empty set of playable strategies;
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(⋄) A is closed under concatenation ⋄ : ∀τ > 0, A′, A′′ ∈ A A′ ⋄τ A
′′ ∈ A.
Condition (P) is necessary for all strategies to be applicable for whichever starting information.
Condition (⋄) allows the player to switch strategies at some a priori defined time.
Formalization of lower game. Consider a two-player lower game with a payoff function
c : K → R . The first player wishes to maximize c ; the second player wishes to minimize it.
The first player also has a family A of playable strategies.
The lower game is conducted in the following way: for a given ω ∈ Ω, the first player
demonstrates a set A ∈ A , and then the second player chooses a process z ∈ A ∩ Γ(ω) . The
value function of this game is
V
♭[c](ω) , sup
A∈A
inf
z∈A∩Γ(ω)
c(z) ∀ω ∈ Ω. (8a)
Note that for every playable strategy A , A ∩ Γ(ω) 6= ∅; therefore, this definition is valid if c
is bounded.
Definition 1 For each positive ε, let us say that the lower game of ( 8a ) has an ε -optimal
strategy A ∈ A if infz∈A c(z) ≥ V
♭[c](z(0))− ε.
Formalization of upper game. We still have two players, the first player maximizes the
payoff c , whereas the second player minimizes it. Let the second player also have a family B
of playable strategies.
The upper game is conducted in the following way. Given ω ∈ Ω, let the second demonstrate
some set B ∈ B , then let the first player choose a process z ∈ B ∩ Γ(ω) . The value function
of the upper game is
V
♯[c](ω) , inf
B∈B
sup
z∈B∩Γ(ω)
c(z) ∀ω ∈ Ω. (8b)
Definition 2 For each positive ε, let us say that the upper game of ( 8b ) has an ε -optimal
strategy B ∈ B if supz∈A c(z) ≤ V
♯[c](z(0)) + ε.
Note that 1− V♯[c](ω) = supB∈B infz∈B∩Γ(ω)
(
1− c(z)
)
for all ω ∈ Ω, i.e., the upper game
with payoff c and with set B of the second player’s strategies differs from the lower game with
payoff 1 − c and with set B of the first player’s strategies only in its sign. Consequently, all
definitions and statements below will mostly be given for the lower game. For the upper game
families, they can be obtained by the replacement g− , 1− g, A− , B.
In what follows, fix A and B ; to every payoff c , it is possible to map the pair of corre-
sponding games by rules ( 8a ) and ( 8b ) .
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Definition 3 For a payoff c : K → R , let us say that the corresponding games have a saddle
point if V♭[c](ω) = V♯[c](ω) for all ω ∈ Ω.
On various payoffs. Let us now define time average vT (z) and discount average wλ(z) for
each process z ∈ K by the rules:
vT (z) ,
1
T
∫ T
0
g(z(t)) dt, wλ(z) , λ
∫ ∞
0
e−λtg(z(t)) dt ∀z ∈ K, T > 0, λ > 0. (9)
Note that the definitions are valid, and the means lie within [0, 1]. The functions vT , wλ will
be treated as the payoff functions in their respective games. In particular, for any T, λ > 0 ,
we obtain the values
V
♭
T (ω),V
♭[vT ](ω)=sup
A∈A
inf
z∈A∩Γ(ω)
vT (z),V
♯
T (ω),V
♯[vT ](ω)= inf
B∈B
sup
z∈B∩Γ(ω)
vT (z), ∀ω ∈ Ω,(10a)
W
♭
λ(ω),V
♭[wλ](ω)=sup
A∈A
inf
z∈A∩Γ(ω)
wλ(z),W
♯
λ(ω),V
♯[wλ](ω)= inf
B∈B
sup
z∈B∩Γ(ω)
wλ(z), ∀ω ∈ Ω.(10b)
We will also need Bolza-type payoffs. For each map U : R>0 × Ω → R and positive h, T, λ ,
define the following payoffs:
cˆUh,T (z) ,
1
T + h
∫ h
0
g(z(t)) dt+
T
T + h
UT (z(h)) ∀z ∈ K; (11a)
cˇUh,λ(z) , λ
∫ h
0
e−λtg(z(t)) dt+ e−λhUλ(z(h)) ∀z ∈ K. (11b)
For the following theorem, in ( 11a ) and ( 11b ) , we need to use U = V ♭ = V ♯, U = W ♭ = W ♯ ,
respectively.
Uniform Tauberian theorem for games with a saddle point.
Theorem 3 Let A and B satisfy conditions (P) , (⋄) .
Assume that for each λ, T, h > 0 , for each of the following payoffs vT , cˆ
V ♭
h,T , wλ , cˇ
W ♭
h,λ the
corresponding games have saddle points and ε -optimal player’s strategies from A,B respec-
tively for all ε > 0 .
Then, the following limits exist, are uniform in ω ∈ Ω , and coincide
lim
T↑∞
V
♯
T (ω) = lim
T↑∞
V
♭
T (ω) = lim
λ↓0
W
♯
λ(ω) = lim
λ↓0
W
♭
λ(ω) ∀ω ∈ Ω (12)
if at least one of these limits exists, and is uniform in ω ∈ Ω.
For the proof of this theorem, refer to Sect. 4. The condition of existence of a saddle point can
be relaxed, see Corollary 2, also in Sect. 4.
The conditions of Theorem 3 mostly deal with the value functions, however, a similar
theorem can be formulated in terms of the capabilities of players. To this end, consider the
following:
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Additional conditions for capabilities’ sets.
In addition to concatenation, let us also define time-shift. For a time τ ∈ T and a process
z ∈ K , define the function zτ : T 7→ Ω by the following rule:
zτ (t) = z(t + τ) ∀t ∈ T. (13)
We say that a family A of playable strategies allows the separation of ω (at the initial
time) if, for each mapping η : Ω→ A ,
∃A ∈ A ∀ω ∈ Ω η(ω) ∩ Γ(ω) = A ∩ Γ(ω).
Call a family A closed under backward shift if, for all A ∈ A , τ > 0 , there exists a A′ ∈ A
such that A = A ⋄τ A
′. It is easy see that A = A ⋄τ A
′ implies {zτ | z ∈ A} ⊂ A
′.
We say that families A and B are compatible if, for all ω ∈ Ω ,A ∈ A, B ∈ B, A∩B∩Γ(ω)
is non-empty.
So, let us also define the following conditions:
(C) A and B are compatible;
(ω) A allows the separation of ω (at the initial time);
(τ) A is closed under backward shift.
(C) is a stronger variant of condition (P) ; the former is relatively often used for the
games with a saddle point, see, for example [8, Subsect. VIII.3]. We will use it in Lemma 4.
Condition (ω) lets the player use the data on the initial ω ; under this condition, we can
always provide ε -optimal players’ strategies (see Lemma 3). (⋄)& (ω) let the player plan the
switch of strategies at a given time in advance, at the beginning of the game; the switch is
based on the information about the state that would realize at the time of the switch. In
particular, this switching can be used to construct, in the framework of the Tauberian theorem,
the near-optimal strategies, see Remark 3 and ( 36 ) , ( 50 ) . Condition (τ) means that an
action is admissible for this information at a positive time if this action is admissible for this
information at zero time; below, we will only use this condition to prove Bellman’s optimality
principle (see Lemma 2).
Uniform Tauberian theorems for games without a saddle point.
Theorem 4 Let A and B satisfy conditions (C) , (⋄) , (ω) , (τ) .
If, either for lower and upper games with payoffs vT (T > 0) , or for lower and upper games
with payoffs wλ (λ > 0) , limits of their values (in ( 12 ) ) exist, are uniform in ω ∈ Ω , and
coincide, then, all limits in ( 12 ) exist, are uniform in ω ∈ Ω , and coincide.
Our main objective for two next Sections is to prove these theorems.
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3 One-sided Tauberian theorems.
On game families. Below, we will consider various directed sets of payoffs, which we will
index by positive numbers. For example, wλ (λ ↓ 0), vT (T ↑ ∞), wλ (λ ↓ 0), vT (T ↑ ∞),
cˆUh,T (T ↑ ∞), cˇ
U
h,λ(λ ↓ 0) for some h > 0, U : R>0 × Ω → R. For brevity, for all of these
payoff families, we might also use the notation νγ (γ → γ∗), with γ > 0, γ∗ ∈ {0,+∞}, and
payoffs νγ. For all γ > 0 , the set [γ,∞) (respectively, (0, γ] ) is called a neighborhood of γ∗
if γ∗ = +∞ (if γ∗ = 0 ).
On guaranties and suboptimality principles. Consider functions S : Ω → R , U :
R>0 × Ω→ R .
Definition 4 Let us say that a lower game ( 8a ) (respectively, or ( 10a ) , or ( 10b ) ) has a
guarantee S if V♭[c](ω) ≥ S(ω) (respectively, or V ♭T (ω) ≥ S(ω) , or W
♭
λ(ω) ≥ S(ω) ) for all
ω ∈ Ω .
Let us say that a guarantee S of lower game ( 8a ) with payoff c is protected if there exists
a strategy A ∈ A satisfying c(z) ≥ S(z(0)) for all z ∈ A.
Let us say that a lower game family with payoffs νγ(γ → γ∗) has an asymptotic guarantee
U (a protected asymptotic guarantee) if, for each ε > 0 , there exists a neighborhood of γ∗ such
that Uγ − ε , as function from Ω to R , is a guarantee (a protected guarantee) for lower game
with payoff νγ for all γ from this neighborhood.
Note that each function S : Ω→ R may be regarded as a function from R>0×Ω to R , which
does not depend on the first argument; therefore, S may be an asymptotic guarantee.
Definition 5 Let us say that a function U : R>0 ×Ω→ R is a subsolution of the lower game
family with payoffs vT (T ↑ ∞) if, for every ε > 0 , there exists a positive T¯ such that, for all
h > 0, T > T¯ , there exists a strategy A ∈ A such that
UT+h(z(0))− ε ≤ cˆ
U
h,T (z) =
1
T + h
∫ h
0
g(z(t)) dt+
T
T + h
UT (z(h)) ∀z ∈ A, (14a)
i.e., for all h>0, T >T¯ , the function UT+h−ε is a protected guarantee of the lower game with
payoff cˆUh,T .
Let us say that a function U : R>0 × Ω → R is a subsolution of the lower game family
with payoffs wλ(λ ↓ 0) if, for every ε > 0 , there exists a positive λ¯ such that, for all positive
λ < λ¯, for all h > 0 , there exists a strategy A ∈ A such that
Uλ(z(0))− ε ≤ cˇ
U
h,λ(z) = λ
∫ h
0
e−λtg(z(t)) dt+ e−λhUλ(z(h)) ∀z ∈ A, (14b)
i.e., for all positive λ < λ¯, for all h > 0 , Uλ − ε is a protected guarantee of lower game with
payoff cˇUh,λ.
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For a similar definition, refer to [8, Sect. VI.4], suboptimality principle [8, Definition III.2.31]
(also referred to as ‘stability with respect to second player’ [33], and [8, Sect. VI.4] for discrete
problems).
Remark 1 Let a payoff family νγ (γ → γ∗) be either vT (T ↑ ∞) , or wλ (λ ↓ 0) , Assume
U, U ′ from R×Ω to R has a common limit as γ → γ∗, and this limit is uniform on Ω . Then,
1. U is an asymptotic guarantee of the lower game family with payoffs νγ(γ → γ∗) iff U
′
is the same;
2. U is a protected asymptotic guarantee of this lower game family iff U ′ is the same;
3. U is a subsolution of this lower game family iff U ′ is the same.
One-sided Tauberian theorems for lower game families.
In Appendix B, we prove the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Let A satisfy conditions (P) , (⋄) .
Let a bounded from above function U : R>0 × Ω → R be a subsolution for the lower game
family with payoffs vT (T ↑ ∞) , in particular, let ( 14a ) hold.
Let also U satisfy
lim inf
T↑∞
inf
ω∈Ω
(
UpT (ω)− UT (ω)
)
≥ 0 ∀p > 1. (15a)
Then, for every ε > 0 , there exists a natural N such that, for all positive λ < 1/N, a
function U1/λ − ε is a protected guarantee of the lower game with payoff wλ; in particular,
W
♭
λ(ω) ≥ U1/λ(ω)− ε ∀ω ∈ Ω, λ ∈ (0, 1/N).
In Appendix C, we prove the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Let A satisfy conditions (P) , (⋄) .
Let a bounded from above function U : R>0 × Ω → R be a subsolution for the lower game
family with payoffs wλ(λ ↓ 0), in particular, let ( 14b ) hold.
Let also U satisfy
lim inf
λ↓0
inf
ω∈Ω
(
Uλ(ω)− Upλ(ω)
)
≥ 0 ∀p > 1. (15b)
Then, for every ε > 0 , there exists a natural N such that, for all positive T > N, a
function U1/T − ε is a protected guarantee of the lower game with payoff vT ; in particular,
V
♭
T (ω) ≥ U1/T (ω)− ε ∀ω ∈ Ω, T > N.
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Note that ( 15b ) holds for U if either U is decreasing in λ for all ω ∈ Ω , or U has limit
as λ ↓ 0 , and this limit is uniform in ω ∈ Ω, or U is a sum of such functions. Analogously,
( 15a ) holds for U if either U is increasing in T for all ω ∈ Ω or U has limit as T ↑ ∞ ,
and this limit is uniform in ω ∈ Ω, or U is a sum of such functions.
The inequalities similar to ( 15a ) will be found in Uniform Tauberian Theorem, (see defi-
nitions of slowly decreasing, slowly varying, for example, in [10, Definition 4.1.4],[26, Sect.6.2]).
For stochastic games the similar inequalities can see in [38] (Condition (3∗) from Theorem 4.1).
Note that, in addition to uniform and exponential payoff families, the Tauberian theorems
can be formulated for arbitrary probability densities. The corresponding results are seen for
discrete time systems [40],[44], for optimal control [36], for games [32]. In [32], it is made based
on the corresponding One-sided Tauberian theorems similar to Propositions 1,2.
Corollary 1 Let A satisfy conditions (P) , (⋄) . Let the functions V ♭ , W ♭ be subsolutions
for the lower game families with payoffs vT (T ↑ ∞) and with payoffs wλ(λ ↓ 0) , respectively.
If there exists a limit of V ♭T that is uniform on Ω :
S∗(ω) = lim
T↑∞
V
♭
T (ω) ∀ω ∈ Ω,
then, this limit S∗ is a common protected asymptotic guarantee for lower game families with
payoffs vT (T ↑ ∞) and wλ(λ ↓ 0) .
If there exists a limit of W ♭λ that is uniform on Ω :
S∗(ω) = lim
λ↓0
W
♭
λ(ω) ∀ω ∈ Ω,
then, this limit S∗ is a common protected asymptotic guarantee for lower game families with
payoffs vT (T ↑ ∞) and wλ(λ ↓ 0) .
Proof of Corollary 1. Assume that there exists a limit of V ♭T that is uniform on Ω . The
uniformity of this limit implies ( 15a ) for U ≡ V ♭, also, we see that V ♭, S∗ are asymptotic
guaranties for the lower game family with payoffs vT (T ↑ ∞).
We claim that S∗ is a protected asymptotic guarantee for the lower game family with wλ.
By condition, V ♭ is a subsolution for this lower game family. Therefore, S∗ is the same by
Remark 1. Now, by Proposition 1, S∗ is a protected asymptotic guarantee for lower game
family with payoffs wλ.
The second part is proved analogously by Proposition 2, i.e., since S∗ is an asymptotic
guarantee for the lower game family with payoffs wλ, S∗ is also a protected asymptotic guar-
antee for the lower game family with vT . By the first part of the proof, now S∗ is a protected
asymptotic guarantee for the lower game family with payoffs wλ. The proof of the same fact
for the payoff family vT (T ↑ ∞) is similar. 
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4 Proofs of main results. Their corollaries.
Auxiliary lemmas. The formulations.
Similarly [8, Remark III.2.7], for continuous dynamic systems with payoff wλ , we obtain:
Lemma 1 Let the set A satisfy conditions (P) , (⋄) . Let ε, T, λ be positive. Then,
1) V♭
[
cˆUh,T
]
− ε is a guarantee of lower game with payoff vT+h for all h > 0 if UT − ε is
a protected guarantee of lower game with payoff vT ;
2) V♭
[
cˇUh,λ
]
− ε is a guarantee of lower game with payoff wλ for all h > 0 if Uλ − ε is a
protected guarantee of lower game with payoff wλ.
Lemma 2 Let the set A satisfy conditions (P) , (τ) . Then,
1) V ♭ is a subsolution for the lower game family with payoffs vT (T ↑ ∞) if V
♭ is a
protected asymptotic guarantee for this lower game family;
2) W ♭ is a subsolution for the lower game family with payoffs wλ(λ ↓ 0) if W
♭ is a
protected asymptotic guarantee for this lower game family.
We will also need the two lemmas that are essentially contained in [32, Lemma 2.1].
Lemma 3 Let the set A satisfy conditions (P), (ω) . Let a mapping c : K → R be bounded.
Then, for all ε > 0 , V♭[c]− ε is a protected guarantee for lower game with payoff c .
Lemma 4 Let the sets A,B satisfy condition (C) . Then, V♭[c] ≤ V♯[c] for a bounded payoff
c : K → R .
The proofs of all lemmas are located in Appendix A.
Note that, for a payoff family νγ (γ → γ∗) , if lower and upper game families with νγ(γ →
γ∗) have a common asymptotic guarantee S∗ : Ω → R, then, for all ε > 0 , for all γ from
some neighborhood of γ∗ , we obtain
V
♯[νγ](ω)− ε ≤ S∗(ω) ≤ V
♭[νγ ](ω) + ε ∀ω ∈ Ω. (16)
Conceptually, the proofs of Theorems 3,4 and their corollaries consist of the two parts. By
checking the conditions of one of Propositions 1 and 2, we prove ( 16 ) . Its converse inequality,
in the case of Theorem 4, is based on Lemma 4 and, in the case of Theorem 3, on the existence
of a saddle point for games with payoffs vT , wλ.
Proof of Theorem 3
By condition, V ♭T ≡ V
♯
T , W
♭
λ ≡ W
♭
λ for all λ, T > 0 . Therefore, for each h, λ, T > 0 , the
games with the payoff cˆV
♭
h,T and the games with the payoffs cˆ
V ♯
h,T coincide completely. The same
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is true for the pair of payoffs cˇV
♭
h,T , cˇ
V ♯
h,T . Thus, we can consider the conditions of the theorem
with respect to lower and upper games to be totally symmetric.
If at least one of limits from ( 12 ) exists and is uniform on Ω, then, either the limit of
V ♭T = V
♯
T as T ↑ ∞, or the limit of W
♭
λ = W
♯
λ as λ ↓ 0 exists, and is uniform in ω ∈ Ω.
Assume that it is the limit S∗ of V
♭
T , V
♯
T as T ↑ ∞.
We claim that S∗ is a protected asymptotic guarantee for the lower game family with
wλ(λ ↓ 0) .
Fix a ε, T > 0. By condition, we can find ε -optimal strategies for payoff vT . So, V
♯
T + ε
is a protected guarantee of upper game with payoff vT . Using Lemma 1 for upper games, we
obtain
V
♯
T+h ≤ V
♯
[
cˆV
♯
h,T
]
+ ε
for all h > 0 . By hypothesis, for each h > 0 , there exists ε -optimal strategy Ah ∈ A for
payoff cˆV
♯
h,T ; now,
V
♯
T+h(z(0))− 2ε ≤ V
♭
[
cˆV
♯
h,T
]
(z(0))− ε ≤ cˆV
♯
h,T (z) ∀z ∈ A
h.
So, ( 14a ) with U = V ♯ holds for all positive h. Thus, V ♯ is a subsolution of lower game
family with payoffs vT .
Then, by Proposition 1, V ♯ is a protected asymptotic guarantee for lower game family with
wλ(λ ↓ 0) . Now, by Remark 1, S∗ is the same.
Analogously, by symmetry with respect to lower and upper games, one can prove that S∗ ,
as the uniform limit of V ♯ , is a protected asymptotic guarantee for upper game family with
wλ(λ ↓ 0) .
So, S∗ is an asymptotic guarantee for lower and upper game families with wλ(λ ↓ 0) , i.e.,
( 16 ) holds for this family. Now, by W ♯ ≡ W ♭ , S∗ is the limit of W
♭
λ and W
♯
λ , and this limit
is uniform.
The second part of the proof is very similar, it is only necessary to swap λ and T , vT and
wλ everywhere, and use cˇh,λ, Proposition 2 instead of cˆh,T , Proposition 1. 
Let us make Theorem 3 more precise. Recall that γ∗ ∈ {0+,+∞}.
Definition 6 For payoff family νγ (γ → γ∗) , let us say that this family has an asymptotic
saddle point if the limit of |V♭[νγ ](ω) − V
♯[νγ ](ω)| as γ → γ∗ exists, is equal to 0 , and is
uniform for ω ∈ Ω .
Definition 7 For a monotonic function κ : R>0 → R>0 with κ(γ) → 0 as γ → γ∗, let us
say that κ is a precision of family of payoffs νγ (γ → γ∗) if the lower and upper games with
the payoff νγ have κ(γ) -optimal strategies for each player. Let us say that κ is a common
precision for a set of payoff families if κ is a precision for each payoff family from this set.
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Remark 2 Consider a family of payoffs νγ (γ → γ∗) . Any monotonic function κ : R>0 →
R>0 with κ(γ)→ 0 as γ → γ∗ is actually a precision of this family if all corresponding games
have ε -optimal players’ strategies for a positive ε.
Corollary 2 Let A and B satisfy conditions (P) , (⋄) . Assume that both payoff families
vT (T ↑ ∞) , wλ(λ ↓ 0) have a precision and an asymptotic saddle point. Also, for each of set
of payoff families
{cˆV
♭
h,T (T ↑ ∞) | h > 0}, {cˆ
V ♯
h,T (T ↑ ∞) | h > 0}, {cˇ
W ♯
h,λ(λ ↓ 0) | h > 0}, {cˇ
W ♯
h,λ(λ ↓ 0) | h > 0},
let there exist a common precision for this set.
Then, all limits in ( 12 ) exist, are uniform in ω ∈ Ω , and coincide if at least one of these
limits exists and is uniform in ω ∈ Ω.
Proof of Corollary 2. By condition, the limit of |V ♭T (ω)− V
♯
T (ω)| as T ↑ ∞ and the limit of
|W ♭λ(ω)−W
♭
λ(ω)| as λ ↓ 0 equal 0 and are uniform in ω ∈ Ω.
Now, if at least one of limits in ( 12 ) exists, and is uniform on Ω, then, either the limit of
V ♭T and V
♯
T as T ↑ ∞, or the limit of W
♭
λ and W
♯
λ as λ ↓ 0 , exists and is uniform in ω ∈ Ω.
Assume that it is the limit S∗ of V
♭
T and V
♯
T as T ↑ ∞.
By condition, there exists a precision function κˆ : R>0 → R>0 with κˆ(T ) → 0 as T ↑ ∞
such that, |V ♭T (ω)−V
♯
T (ω)| < κˆ(T ) for all ω ∈ Ω. As corollary, |cˆ
V ♭
h,T (z)− cˆ
V ♯
h,T (z)| < κˆ(T ) for
all z ∈ K, h > 0. In addition, by condition, increasing the function κˆ if necessary (provided
that κˆ(+∞) = 0) , we can propose that, for all T, h > 0 , games with payoffs cˆV
♯
h,T , cˆ
V ♯
h,T also
have κˆ(T ) -optimal players’ strategies. Now, we can consider the conditions of the theorem to
be totally symmetric with respect to lower and upper games.
We claim that S∗ is a protected asymptotic guarantee for lower game family with wλ(λ ↓ 0) .
Fix a positive T. By condition, we can find κˆ(T ) -optimal strategies for the payoff vT . Using
Lemma 1 for upper games, we obtain
V
♯
T+h − κˆ(T ) ≤ V
♯
[
cˆV
♯
h,T
]
∀h > 0.
By the choice of κˆ , for all h > 0 , there exists κˆ(T ) -optimal strategy Ah ∈ A for payoff cˆV
♯
h,T ;
now
V
♯
T+h(z(0))− 2κˆ(T ) ≤ V
♭
[
cˆV
♯
h,T
]
(z(0))− κˆ(T ) ≤ cˆV
♯
h,T (z) ∀z ∈ A
h.
So, ( 14a ) with U = V ♯ hold for all positive h. Thus, V ♯ is a subsolution of lower game
family with payoffs vT (T ↑ ∞) . Now, by Remark 1, S∗ is the same. By Proposition 1, S∗ is
a protected asymptotic guarantee for lower game family with payoffs wλ(λ ↓ 0) .
Analogously, by symmetry with respect to lower and upper games, one can prove that S∗ ,
as the uniform limit of V ♯ , is a protected asymptotic guarantee for upper game family with
wλ(λ ↓ 0) .
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Now, S∗ is an asymptotic guarantee for lower and upper game families with wλ(λ ↓ 0) ,
i.e., ( 16 ) holds for this family. Since |W ♯λ(ω)−W
♭
λ(ω)| as λ ↓ 0 uniformly (on Ω ) tends to
0 , S∗ is the limit of W
♭
λ and W
♯
λ , and this limit is uniform.
The second part of the proof is analogous, it suffices to swap λ and T , vT and wλ , λ ↓ 0
and T ↑ ∞ everywhere and use cˇh,λ, κˇ, Proposition 2 instead of cˆh,T , κˆ , Proposition 1. 
Note that the conditions of the corollary regarding the precision function can be relaxed. For
example, in the case where the limit S∗ of V
♭
T (or V
♯
T ) as T ↑ ∞ exists and is uniform on Ω ,
in Corollary 2, it is sufficient to provide the existence of a precision function for vT (T ↑ ∞) and
common precisions for sets {cˆV
♭
h,T (T ↑ ∞) | h > 0} , {cˆ
V ♯
h,T (T ↑ ∞) | h > 0}. Moreover, common
precisions for sets {cˆV
♭
h,T (T ↑ ∞) | h > 0} , {cˆ
V ♯
h,T (T ↑ ∞) | h > 0}, {cˆ
S∗
h,T (T ↑ ∞) | h > 0} can
only exist simultaneously, i.e., it is sufficient to check any one of them.
On Tauberian theorem for abstract control system.
We can obtain the Tauberian theorem for abstract control system [41]. Following [41],
assume the sets Ω , K to be given; moreover, assume K to be closed under concatenation
and Γ(ω) , defined as above, to be non-empty for all ω ∈ Ω . Set B , {K}. Consider all the
possible selectors of the multivalued mapping ω 7→ Γ(ω) ; let A be the set of all possible images
of these mappings. The closedness of K under concatenation implies the same for A ,B . We
can directly check that, for a bounded payoff, the corresponding games have saddle points and
ε -optimal players’ strategies for a positive ε. Therefore, by Corollary 1, we get the Tauberian
theorem for abstract control system [41].
On Tauberian theorem for normal form games. Proof of Theorem 1
For all l ∈ L , m ∈ M, define Al ,
{
z[ω, l,m′]
∣∣ω ∈ Ω, m′ ∈ M}, Bm , {z[ω, l′, m] ∣∣ω ∈
Ω, l′ ∈ L
}
. Set A , {Al | l ∈ L} ,B , {Bm |m ∈ M}. It is easy see that Al ∩ Bm ∩ Γ(ω) =
{z[ω, l,m]} 6= ∅ for all l ∈ L , m ∈ M, ω ∈ Ω. Thus, condition (P) holds for A,B.
For each mapping ζ : Ω → A , for each ω ∈ Ω , there exists a lω ∈ L(ω) such that
ζ(ω) ∩ Γ(ω) = Alω ∩ Γ(ω). Define l
∗ ∈ L by the rule l∗(ω) , lω(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. Now,
Al∗ ∈ A satisfies ζ(ω) ∩ Γ(ω) = Al∗ ∩ Γ(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. So, condition (ω) holds for A.
Analogously, it is easy to prove that B is the same. Thus, the result of Lemma 3 holds.
Moreover, comparing ( 2a ) and ( 7 ) , we obtain that, for all τ > 0, for all Al′ , Al′′ ∈ A ,
there exists Al ∈ A such that Al ∩ Γ(ω) = (Al′ ⋄τ Al′′) ∩ Γ(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω . So, A is closed
with respect to concatenation. Analogously, ( 2b ) and ( 7 ) imply that B is the same.
Now, comparing relations ( 3a ) , ( 3b ) with relations ( 8a ) , ( 8b ) , ( 9 ) , we obtain V ♭ ≡
V ♮ ≡ V ♯,W ♭ ≡ W ♮ ≡ W ♯, i.e., for all λ, T > 0, for each of the following payoffs vT , wλ ,
the corresponding games have saddle points. Comparing relations ( 3c ) , ( 3d ) with relations
( 11a ) , ( 11b ) , we obtain the same for payoffs cˆV
♭
h,T , cˇ
W ♭
h,λ for each λ, T, h > 0.
By Lemma 3, for each λ, T, h > 0 , for each of the following payoffs vT , cˆ
V ♭
h,T , wλ , cˇ
W ♭
h,λ , the
16
corresponding games have ε -optimal player’s strategies from A,B respectively for all ε > 0 .
All conditions of Theorem 3 are verified. By this theorem we obtain what was needed. 
Proof of Theorem 4.
Note that condition (C) implies the result of Lemma 4. Therefore, V♭[c] ≤ V♯[c] for every
bounded payoffs c. Then, it is sufficient to prove ( 16 ) for two payoff families: vT (T ↑ ∞)
and wλ(λ ↓ 0) .
The condition (ω) implies the result of Lemma 3. By Remark 2, two payoff families
vT (T ↑ ∞) , wλ(λ ↓ 0) have precisions.
By condition, one of both limits, either the common limit of V ♭T and V
♯
T as T ↑ ∞, or the
common limit of W ♭λ and W
♯
λ as λ ↓ 0, exists and is uniform in ω ∈ Ω. Denote this limit by
S∗. The corresponding payoff family has a precision. Then, by Remark 1, S∗ is a protected
asymptotic guarantee for lower and upper game families with this payoff family.
Now, condition (τ) implies the result of Lemma 2 for this payoff family. By Remark 1, S∗
is a subsolution for the corresponding game family. Then, by Corollary 1, S∗ is a common
protected asymptotic guarantee for both lower game families with payoffs vT (T ↑ ∞) and with
payoffs wλ(λ ↓ 0) .
Because B satisfies the same set of conditions as A does, the assumptions of this Theorem
with respect to lower and upper games are totally symmetric. Then, this limit S∗ is a common
protected asymptotic guarantee for upper game families with payoffs vT (T ↑ ∞) and payoffs
wλ(λ ↓ 0) . This implies that ( 16 ) holds. 
As follows from this proof, condition (ω) can be relaxed:
Corollary 3 Let A and B satisfy conditions (C) , (⋄) , (τ) .
If payoff family vT (T ↑ ∞) has a precision and the limits of V
♭
T ,V
♯
T (in ( 12 ) ) exist as
T ↑ ∞ , are uniform on Ω, and coincide, then all limits in ( 12 ) exist, are uniform on Ω, and
coincide.
If payoff family wλ(λ ↓ 0) has a precision and the limits of W
♭
λ,W
♯
λ (in ( 12 ) ) exist as
λ ↓ 0 , are uniform on Ω, and coincide, then all limits in ( 12 ) exist, are uniform on Ω, and
coincide.
Moreover, in each of this cases, S∗ is a common protected asymptotic guarantee for lower
and upper game families with payoffs vT (T ↑ 0) and wλ(λ ↓ 0) .
Remark 3 Under conditions of Corollary 3, we can apply Remark 4 from Appendix A. Then,
by Remark 5 from Appendix B and Remark 6 from Appendix C, the strategies that protect a
guarantee S∗ for one of the game families (with payoffs vT (T ↑ 0) or wλ(λ ↓ 0) ), are expressed
(see ( 36 ) , ( 50 ) ) through such strategies for the other game family.
On Tauberian theorem for normal form games. Proof of Theorem 2.
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For all l ∈ L , m ∈ M, define Al ,
{
z[ω, l,m′]
∣∣ω ∈ Ω, m′ ∈ M}, Bm , {z[ω, l′, m] ∣∣ω ∈
Ω, l′ ∈ L
}
. Set A , {Al | l ∈ L} ,B , {Bm |m ∈ M}. It is easy see that Al ∩ Bm ∩ Γ(ω) =
{z[ω, l,m]} 6= ∅ for all l ∈ L , m ∈ M, ω ∈ Ω. Thus, conditions (P) and (C) hold for A,B.
For each mapping ζ : Ω → A , for each ω ∈ Ω , there exists a lω ∈ L(ω) such that
ζ(ω)∩Γ(ω) = Alω ∩Γ(ω). Define l
∗(ω) , lω(ω). Now, ζ(ω)∩Γ(ω) = Al∗ ∩Γ(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω.
Thus, condition (ω) holds for A. Analogously, it is easy prove that B is the same.
For all τ > 0 , for all l′, l′′ ∈ L , ω ∈ Ω ,
Al′ ⋄τ Al′′
(7)
=
{
z′ ⋄τ z
′′
∣∣ z′ ∈ Al′ , z′′ ∈ Al′′ , z′(τ) = z′′(0)}
=
{
z[ω, l′, m′] ⋄τ z[ω
′, l′′, m′′] |m′, m′′ ∈ M, ω′ = z[ω, l′, m′](τ)
}
(5a)
=
{
z[ω, l′ ⋄τ l
′′, m′ ⋄τ m
′′] |m′, m′′ ∈ M
}
(5b)
=
{
z[ω, l′ ⋄τ l
′′, m] |m ∈ M
}
= Al′⋄τ l′′ ∈ A.
So, A is closed with respect to concatenation. Moreover, by ( 5b ) , for all l′ ∈ L , there exists
l′′ ∈ L satisfying l′ ⋄τ l
′′ = l′. Then, Al′ ⋄τ Al′′ = Al′ . So, A is closed under backward shift.
Analogously, it is easy prove that B is the same.
Now, comparing relations ( 6a ) , ( 6b ) with relations ( 8a ) , ( 8b ) , ( 9 ) , we see that all con-
ditions of Corollary 3 are verified. By this corollary we obtain what was required. 
5 Games for discrete setting
Game statement.
Recall that N = {1, 2, 3, . . . }. Let a set Ω¯ be nonempty. Let K¯ be a set of admissible
processes y¯ : N ∪ {0} → Ω . For all ω¯ ∈ Ω¯, consider a set Γ¯(ω¯) , {y¯ ∈ K¯ | y¯(0) = ω¯} of
processes y¯ ∈ K¯ with y¯(0) = ω¯ . Let these sets be also non-empty for all ω¯ ∈ Ω¯.
Again, the first player wishes to maximize a payoff function c : K¯ → R ; the second player
wishes to minimize it. Players are given the sets A,B of subsets of K¯ , their sets of strategies.
To ensure that the lower and upper games are well-defined, assume that, for each ω¯ ∈ Ω¯ , for
all A¯ ∈ A¯ , B¯ ∈ A¯ , sets A¯ ∩ B¯ ∩ Γ¯(ω¯) are non-empty.
Fix a function g¯ : Ω¯→ [0, 1]. For all µ ∈ (0, 1), n ∈ N , define payoffs v¯n, w¯µ as follows:
v¯n(y¯) =
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
g¯(y¯(t)) ∈ [0, 1], w¯µ(y¯) = µ
∞∑
t=0
(1− µ)ig¯(y¯(t)) ∈ [0, 1] ∀y¯ ∈ K¯.
For simplicity, assume that, both for the payoffs v¯n and payoffs wµ , the corresponding
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games have their saddle points, i.e., the following definitions are valid:
Vn(ω¯) = sup
A¯∈A¯
inf
y¯∈A¯∩Γ¯(ω¯)
v¯n(y¯) = inf
B¯∈B¯
sup
y¯∈B¯∩Γ¯(ω¯)
v¯n(y¯), ∀n ∈ N, ω¯ ∈ Ω¯, (17a)
Wµ(ω¯) = sup
A¯∈A¯
inf
y¯∈A¯∩Γ¯(ω¯)
w¯µ(y¯) = inf
B¯∈B¯
sup
y¯∈B¯∩Γ(ω¯)
w¯µ(y¯) ∀µ ∈ (0, 1), ω¯ ∈ Ω¯. (17b)
We will also need a condition to guarantee the existence of near-optimal strategies for the
players. For all ε > 0 , or, in the games with the payoffs wµ (µ ∈ (0, 1)) for sufficiently small
µ , or, respectively, the games with the payoffs vn (n ∈ N) for sufficiently large n , each player
has ε -optimal strategies, i.e., for all ε > 0 there exists N ∈ N such that
∀n > N ∃A¯n,ε ∈ A, B¯n,ε ∈ B ∀ω¯ ∈ Ω¯ inf
y¯∈A¯n,ε∩Γ¯(ω¯)
v¯n(y¯) + ε≥Vn(ω¯)≥ sup
y¯∈B¯n,ε∩Γ¯(ω¯)
v¯n(y¯)− ε, (18a)
∀µ ∈ (0, 1
N
) ∃A¯µ,ε ∈ A, B¯µ,ε ∈ B ∀ω¯ ∈ Ω¯ inf
y¯∈A¯µ,ε∩Γ¯(ω¯)
w¯µ(y¯) + ε≥Wµ(ω¯)≥ sup
y¯∈B¯µ,ε∩Γ¯(ω¯)
w¯µ(y¯)− ε. (18b)
Let, for each n ∈ N , for all y¯′, y¯′′ ∈ K¯ with y¯′(n) = y¯′′(0) , define their concatenation
y¯′ ⋄τ y¯
′′ : N→ Ω¯ by the rule:
(y¯′ ⋄n y¯
′′)(i) ,
{
y¯′(i), i ≤ n, i ∈ N ∪ {0};
y¯′′(i− n), i > n, i ∈ N.
So, for all subsets A¯′, A¯′′ ⊂ K¯ and a time n ∈ N , define their concatenation ⋄n by
A¯′ ⋄n A¯
′′ , {y¯′ ⋄n y¯
′′ | y¯′ ∈ A¯′, y¯′′ ∈ A¯′′, y¯′′(n) = y¯′(0)}.
Let us say that A¯ is closed under concatenation and backward shift with integral time
points if, for a natural n ∈ N and for A¯, A¯′ ∈ A , we have A¯ ⋄n A¯
′ ∈ A¯ and A¯ = A¯ ⋄n A¯
′′ for
some A¯′′ ∈ A¯.
Tauberian theorem for games with discrete time.
Theorem 5 Let A¯, B¯ be sets of strategies, and let they be closed under concatenation and
backward shift with integral time points. Assume also that A¯ ∩ B¯ ∩ Γ¯(ω¯) for all ω¯ ∈ Ω¯, A¯ ∈
A¯, B¯ ∈ B¯.
Let, for all n ∈ N, µ ∈ (0, 1) , ( 17a ) - ( 17b ) hold, i.e., let all games with payoffs v¯n , w¯µ
have saddle points.
If ( 18a ) holds and the limit of Vn exists as n →∞ and is uniform in ω¯ ∈ Ω¯, then both
limits
lim
n→∞
Vn(ω¯) = lim
µ↓0
Wµ(ω¯) ∀ω¯ ∈ Ω¯ (19)
exist, are uniform on Ω¯, and coincide; moreover, ( 18a ) , ( 18b ) hold.
On the other hand, if ( 18b ) holds and the limit of Wµ exists as µ ↓ 0 , and is uni-
form in ω¯ ∈ Ω¯, then both limits in ( 19 ) exist, are uniform on Ω¯ , and coincide; moreover,
( 18a ) , ( 18b ) hold.
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Proof of Theorem 5. Reduction to general statement.
To each t ≥ 0 , assign the integral number ⌊t⌋ , the greatest number (from N ∪ {0} ) not
surpassing t. Now, for all t ≥ 0 , 〈t〉 , t− ⌊t⌋ ∈ [0, 1) is the fractional part of t .
Define S , [0, 1) , Ω , Ω¯ × S = Ω¯ × [0, 1) . To each y¯ ∈ K¯, s ∈ S , assign z[y¯, s] : T → Ω
by the rule: z[y¯, s](t) = (y¯(⌊t + s⌋), 〈t+ s〉) for all t ∈ T. Set
K , {z[y¯, s] | y¯ ∈ K¯, s ∈ S}.
Define g(ω¯, s) , g¯(ω¯) for all ω = (ω¯, s) ∈ Ω . Then, for all z[y¯, s] ∈ K , g
(
z[y¯, s](t)
)
=
g¯
(
y¯(⌊t + s⌋)
)
.
Denote by A and B , respectively, the sets of all possible mappings of S ∋ s → ξ(s) ∈ A¯
and S ∋ s→ ξ(s) ∈ B¯. For all ξ ∈ A ∪ B , designate
Z[ξ] , {z[y¯, s] | s ∈ S, y¯ ∈ ξ(s)}, A , {Z[ξ] | ξ ∈ A}, B , {Z[ξ] | ξ ∈ B}.
Now, for all (ω¯, s) ∈ Ω, A = Z[ξA] ∈ A, B = Z[ξB] ∈ B , we obtain
Γ(ω¯, s) = {z[y¯, s′] | ∃y¯ ∈ K¯, s′ ∈ S, y¯(⌊s′⌋) = ω¯, 〈s′〉 = s} = {z[y¯, s] | y¯ ∈ Γ¯(ω¯)}
A ∩B ∩ Γ(ω¯, s) = {z[y¯, s′] | y¯ ∈ ξA(s) ∩ ξB(s) ∩ Γ¯(ω¯)} 6= ∅.
In particular, conditions (P) and (C) hold for A,B .
Proof of Theorem 5. Closedness with respect to concatenation and backward
shift.
It is sufficient to examine the set A¯.
To simplify the notation, for all y¯′, y¯′′ ∈ K¯ with y¯′(0) = y¯′′(0) , set y¯′ ⋄0 y¯
′′ , y¯′′; now,
A¯′ ⋄0 A¯
′′ = A¯′′ for all A¯′, A¯′′ ∈ A¯.
Remember that, for all τ > 0 , one has z′ = z[y¯′, s′], z′′ = z[y¯′′, s′′] ∈ K ; their concatenation
z′⋄τ z
′′ is defined if z′(τ) = z′′(0). Now, z′(τ) = z′′(0) iff 〈τ+s′〉 = 〈s′′〉, y¯′(⌊τ+s′⌋) = y¯′′(⌊s′′⌋)
hold; by s′′ ∈ S , it is now equivalent to the pair of equalities: 〈τ+s′〉 = s′′, y¯′(⌊τ+s′⌋) = y¯′′(0).
Also in this case, 〈τ + s′ + t〉 = 〈s′′ + t〉 , ⌊τ + s′ + t⌋ = ⌊s′′ + t⌋ for all t ≥ 0. Then, we see
that z[y¯′, s′] ⋄τ z[y¯
′′, s′′] is well-defined iff z[y¯′, s′] ⋄τ z[y¯
′′, s′′] = (y¯′ ⋄⌊τ+s′⌋ y¯
′′, s′), s′′ = 〈τ + s′〉
and y¯′(⌊τ + s′⌋) = y¯′′(0) hold, i.e., y¯′ ⋄⌊τ+s′⌋ y¯
′′ is well-defined, and s′′ = 〈τ + s′〉 .
So, for all A′ = Z[ξ′], A′′ = Z[ξ′′] ∈ A , τ > 0, define ξ ∈ A by the rule ξ(s) , ξ′(s) ⋄⌊τ+s⌋
ξ′′(〈τ + s〉) for all s ∈ S. Then, we obtain
A′ ⋄τ A
′′ =
{
z′ ⋄τ z
′′
∣∣ z′ ∈ A′, z′′ ∈ A′′, z′(τ) = z′′(0)}
=
{
z[y¯′, s′] ⋄τ z[y¯
′′, s′′]
∣∣ s′ ∈ S, y¯′ ∈ ξ′(s′), s′′ = 〈τ + s′〉, y¯′′ ∈ ξ′′(s′′), y¯′(⌊τ + s′⌋) = y¯′′(0)}
=
{
z[y¯′ ⋄⌊τ+s′⌋ y¯
′′, s′]
∣∣ s′ ∈ S, y¯′ ∈ ξ′(s′), y¯′′ ∈ ξ′′(〈τ + s′〉), y¯′(⌊τ + s′⌋) = y¯′′(0)}
=
{
z[y¯, s]
∣∣ s ∈ S, y¯ ∈ ξ′(s) ⋄⌊τ+s⌋ ξ′′(〈τ + s〉)} (20)
=
{
z[y¯, s]
∣∣ s ∈ S, y¯ ∈ ξ(s)} = Z[ξ] ∈ A,
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Thus, condition (⋄) proved.
Consider arbitrary A = Z[ξ] , n ∈ N , τ ∈ (n − 1, n] . For all s ∈ S , by condition,
ξ(s) = ξ(s) ⋄⌊τ+s⌋ A¯
(s) for some A¯(s) ∈ A¯ . Define ξ∗ ∈ A by the rule ξ∗(〈τ + s〉) = A¯(s) for all
s ∈ S (i.e. ξ∗(s′) = A¯(s
′+n−τ) for s′ ∈ [0, τ−n+1) , ξ∗(s′) = A¯(s
′+n−1−τ) for s′ ∈ [τ−n+1, 1) ).
Now, ξ(s) = ξ(s) ⋄⌊τ+s⌋ ξ
∗(〈τ + s〉) for all s ∈ S. Then, A∗ , Z[ξ∗] ∈ A satisfies
A ⋄τ A
∗ (20)=
{
z[y¯, s]
∣∣ s ∈ S, y¯ ∈ ξ(s) ⋄⌊τ+s⌋ ξ∗(〈τ + s〉)}
=
{
z[y¯, s]
∣∣ s ∈ S, y¯ ∈ ξ(s)} = Z[ξ] = A.
Thus, condition (τ) is also proved.
Proof of Theorem 5. Payoffs’ comparison.
Consider the following function µ : R>0 → (0, 1) : µ(λ) = 1− e
−λ for all λ > 0 . Note that
µ(0+) = 0 + .
Fix a process z ∈ K . Now, z = z[y¯, s] for some y¯ ∈ K¯, s ∈ S. In addition, for all
y¯ ∈ K¯, s ∈ S we can find such z.
Define z′ , z[y¯, 0] . Then, z ≡ z′s (see ( 13 ) ) and g(z(t− s)) = g¯(y¯(⌊t⌋)) = g(z
′(t)) for all
t ≥ s.
In addition, for all n ∈ N ,
v¯n(y¯) =
1
n
n−1∑
t=0
g¯(y¯(t)) =
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
∫ i+1
i
g(z′(r)) dr =
1
n
∫ n
0
g(z′(r)) dr = vn(z
′). (21a)
Moreover,
∫ t+1
t
λe−λr dr = e−λt − e−λ(t+1) = (1− µ(λ))tµ(λ) for all t ≥ 0, λ > 0 ; now,
w¯µ(λ)(y¯) =
∞∑
i=0
µ(λ)(1− µ(λ))i
∫ i+1
i
g(z′(r)) dr =
∫ ∞
0
λe−λtg(z′(r)) dr = wλ(z
′). (21b)
Define ηˆ(T ) , 4
T
, ηˇ(λ) , 2λ for all T, λ > 0. In Appendix A, we prove inequalities
( 23f ) ; now, for all T, λ > 0 , we obtain
|v¯⌊T ⌋+1(y¯)− vT (z)|
(21a)
= |v⌊T ⌋+1(z
′)− vT (z
′
s)|
(23f )
≤ ηˆ(T ) → 0 as T ↑ ∞; (22a)
|w¯µ(λ)(y¯)− wλ(z)|
(21b)
= |wλ(z
′)− wλ(z
′
s)|
(23f )
≤ ηˇ(λ) → 0 as λ ↓ 0. (22b)
Consider the case where ( 18a ) holds and the limit of Vn (in ( 19 ) ) exists and is uniform
on Ω¯ . Then, ( 22a ) implies that limits of V ♭T and V
♯
T (from ( 12 ) ) exist and are uniform on
Ω . Moreover, by ( 22a ) , ( 18a ) implies that the payoff family vT (T ↑ ∞) has the precision
2ηˆ. Now, by Corollary 3, all limits in ( 12 ) exist, are uniform on Ω, and coincide. Then,
by ( 22a ) - ( 22b ) , all limits in ( 19 ) exist, are uniform on Ω¯, and coincide. Moreover, S∗
is a common protected asymptotic guarantee for lower and upper game families with payoffs
wλ(λ ↓ 0) . By ( 22b ) and ηˇ(λ)→ 0+ , it follows ( 18b ) .
The case where the limit of Wµ exists and is uniform on Ω¯ is analyzed analogously. 
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A Auxiliary facts. The proofs of lemmas.
Let νγ(γ → γ∗) be one of the payoff families, either vT (T ↑ ∞), or wλ(λ ↓ 0) ,
For all h > 0, under νγ = vT , set γ = T , γh = T + h , σh,γ =
T
T+h
= γ
γh
, ργ |[0,γ] ≡
1
γ
,
ργ |(γ,∞) ≡ 0; under νγ = wλ , set γ = λ , γh = λ , σh,γ = e
−λh, ργ(t) = λe
−λt for all t ≥ 0.
For a function U : R>0 × Ω 7→ R , for all h > 0 , we can define a payoff family by the
following rule:
cUh,γ(z) ,
∫ h
0
ργh(t)g(z(t)) dt+ σh,γUγ(z(h)) ∀z ∈ K (γ → γ∗). (23a)
Then, by ( 11a ) , ( 11b ) , cUh,T ≡ cˆ
U
h,T if νγ ≡ vT , and c
U
h,γ ≡ cˇ
U
h,λ if νγ ≡ wλ .
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Note several useful properties: for all γ, h > 0, T ≥ 0, z ∈ K, z′ ∈ Γ(z(h))
ργh(h + T ) = σh,γργ(T ), νγ(z) =
∫ ∞
0
ργ(t)g(z(t)) dt;(23b)
max(0, 1− hργ(0)) < σh,γ < 1,
∫ ∞
0
ργ(t) dt = 1;(23c)
hργ(0) ≥
∫ h
0
ργh(t)z(t) dt
(23b)
= νγh(z)−
∫ ∞
0
σh,γργ(t)z(t + h) dt
(13)
= νγh(z)− σh,γνγ(zh);(23d)
cUh,γ(z)
(23a)
=
∫ h
0
ργh(t)g(z(t)) dt+ σh,γUγ(z(h))
(23a)
= cUh,γ(z ⋄h z
′).(23e)
We claim also that for every z ∈ K, s, r ∈ [0, 1], λ, T > 0 , one has
|wλ(z)− wλ(zs)| ≤ 2λ, |vT+r(z)− vT (zs)| ≤
4
T
. (23f)
Indeed, let νγ(γ → γ∗) be one of the payoff families, either vT (T ↑ ∞), or wλ(λ ↓ 0) . For all
z ∈ K, γ > 0, h ∈ [0, 1) , we obtain
|νγh(z)− νγ(zh)|
(23d)
=
∣∣∣ ∫ h
0
ργh(t)z(t) dt
∣∣∣+ (1− σh,γ)νγ(zh) (23d)≤ hργ(0) + |1− σh,γ| (23c)≤ 2̺γ(0).(24a)
Now, to get the first inequality from ( 23f ) , it is sufficient to make a substitution γ = λ, νγ =
wλ, h = r in ( 24a ) .
It remains to consider the case γ = T, νγ = vT . Recall that, in this case, ργ |[0,γ] ≡
1
γ
,
ργ |(γ,∞) ≡ 0. Now, for all h ∈ [0, 1] , we have γh = γ + h,∫ ∞
0
|ργ(t)− ργ+h(t)| dt ≤
(1
γ
−
1
γ + h
)∫ γ
0
dt+
1
γ + h
∫ γ+h
γ
dt =
2h
γ + h
≤
2
γ
= 2ργ(0).(24b)
Now, for all r, s ∈ [0, 1] , we have h = |γr − γs| ≤ 1 . Then,
|νγr(z)− νγ(zs)|
( 24a )
≤ |νγr(z)− νγs(z)|+ 2̺γ(0)
( 24b )
≤ 4̺γ(0),
and, to get the second inequality from ( 23f ) , it suffices to substitute γ = T, νγ = vT , h = r
into the relation obtained. So, ( 23f ) holds.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let the set A satisfy conditions (P) , (⋄) . Let νγ(γ → γ∗) be one of
the payoff families, either vT (T ↑ ∞), or wλ(λ ↓ 0) . Fix γ, ε > 0.
Let Uγ − ε be a protected guarantee of the lower game with the payoff νγ , i.e, let there
exist a strategy Aγ ∈ A satisfying
Uγ(z(0)) ≤ νγ(z) + ε ∀z ∈ A
γ . (25)
We must prove that V♭
[
cUh,γ
]
− σh,γε is a guarantee of the lower game with the payoff νγh for
all h > 0 .
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Fix h, δ > 0, ω ∈ Ω. There exists a strategy A′ω ∈ A satisfying
V
♭[cUh,γ](ω)− δ ≤ c
U
h,γ(z) ∀z ∈ A
′
ω ∩ Γ(ω).
By ( 23e ) and ( 7 ) , every z ∈ (A′ω ⋄h A
γ) ∩ Γ(ω) also satisfies this inequality and zh ∈ A
γ ;
now, for all z ∈ (A′ω ⋄h A
γ) ∩ Γ(ω) ,
V
♭[cUh,γ](ω)− δ ≤ c
U
h,γ(z)
(23a)
=
∫ h
0
ργh(t)g(z(t)) dt+ σh,γUγ(z(h))
(23d)
= νγh(z)− σh,γνγ(zh) + σh,γUγ(zh(0))
(25)
≤ νγh(z) + σh,γε.
By condition (⋄) , we have A′ω ⋄hA
γ ∈ A . Then, since the choice of z ∈ (A′ω ⋄hA
γ)∩Γ(ω) was
arbitrary, we have
V
♭[cUh,γ](ω)− σh,γε− δ ≤ inf
z∈(A′ω⋄hA
γ)∩Γ(ω)
νγh(z)
≤ sup
A∈A
inf
z∈A∩Γ(ω)
νγh(z) = V
♭[νγh ](ω) ∀ω ∈ Ω.
Thus, since the positive δ was chosen arbitrarily, we have V♭
[
cUh,γ] − σh,γε ≤ V
♭[νγh ] for all
h > 0. 
Proof of Lemma 2.
Let the set A satisfy conditions (P), (τ) . Let νγ(γ → γ∗) be one of the payoff families,
either vT (T ↑ ∞), or wλ(λ ↓ 0) . Set Uγ(ω) , V
♭
[
νγ](ω) for all ω ∈ Ω , γ > 0. Let U be a
protected asymptotic guarantee for the lower game family with payoffs νγ(γ → γ∗) . We must
prove that U is a subsolution for this lower game family.
By condition, there exists a monotonic function κ : R>0 → R>0 with κ(γ) → 0+ as
γ → γ∗ such that Uγ − κ(γ) is a protected guarantee for the lower game with νγ for all
γ > 0.
Consider arbitrary γ, h > 0, A′ ∈ A, z′ ∈ A′. Note that, by (τ) , A′ may be expressed as
A′ = A′ ⋄h A
′′ for some A′′ ∈ A . Now, there exists a z′′ ∈ A′′ ∩ Γ
(
z′(h)
)
such that
νγ(z
′′)− κ(γ) ≤ inf
z∈A′′∩Γ(z′(h))
νγ(z) ≤ V
♭
[
νγ
]
(z′(h)) = Uγ(z
′(h)) (26)
Set z , z′ ⋄h z
′′ ; by zh = z
′
h = z
′′ (see ( 13 ) ), we get
cUh,γ(z
′)
(23e)
=
∫ h
0
̺γhg(z(t)) dt+ σh,γUγ(z(h))
(26)
≥
∫ h
0
̺γhg(z(t)) dt+ σh,γνγ(zh)− σh,γκ(γ)
(23d)
= νγh(z)− σh,γκ(γ)
(23c)
≥ νγh(z)− κ(γ).
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So, to each z′ ∈ A′ , assign z = z′ ⋄h z
′′ ∈ A′ ⋄h A
′′ = A′ with z′(0) = z(0) and cUh,γ(z
′) ≥
νγh(z)− κ(γ). Thus, we have
inf
z′∈A′∩Γ(ω)
cUh,γ(z
′) + κ(γ) ≥ inf
z′∈A′∩Γ(ω)
νγh(z) ∀ω ∈ Ω, A
′ ∈ A.
Recall that, for all γ, h > 0 , Uγh − κ(γh) is a protected guarantee for the lower game with
payoff νγh . Then, Uγh − κ(γ) − κ(γh) is a protected guarantee for lower game with c
U
h,γ for
all h, γ > 0. By κ(γh) ≤ κ(γ) , we obtain that Uγh − 2κ(γ) is a protected guarantee for lower
game with cUh,γ for all h, γ > 0.
Since κ(γ) tends to 0 as γ → γ∗ , U is a subsolution for lower game with payoff νγ(γ →
γ∗) . 
Remark 4 As follows from this proof, under condition (τ) , κ(γ) -optimal strategies for payoff
νγh protect the corresponding asymptotic guarantee for games with c
U
h,γ.
Proof of Lemma 3.
Let A satisfy conditions (P), (ω) . Let a mapping c : K → R be bounded. We must prove
that, for all ε > 0 , V♭[c]− ε is a protected guarantee for the lower game with payoff c .
Indeed, for ε > 0 , for all ω ∈ Ω , there exists a Aω ∈ A such that c(z) > V♭[c](ω) − ε
for all z ∈ Aω ∩ Γ(ω). Set η : Ω → A as follows: η(ω) = Aω for all ω ∈ Ω. By condition
(ω) , there exists a strategy A∗ ∈ A such that A∗ ∩ Γ(ω) = η(ω) ∩ Γ(ω) = Aω ∩ Γ(ω). Then,
c(z) ≥ V♭[c](ω)− ε for all z ∈ A∗ ∩ Γ(ω), ω ∈ Ω , i.e. V♭[c]− ε is a protected guarantee. 
Proof of Lemma 4.
Let A,B satisfy condition (C) , let the payoff c : K → R be bounded. We claim that
V
♭[c] ≤ V♯[c] .
Fix ε > 0 , ω ∈ Ω. There exists Aω ∈ A, Bω ∈ Ω such that c(z′) > V♭[c](ω) − ε ,
c(z′′) < V♯[c](ω) + ε for all z′ ∈ Aω ∩ Γ(ω), z′′ ∈ Bω ∩ Γ(ω). By condition (C) , there exists
z ∈ Aω ∩Bω ∩Γ(ω) . Then, V♭[c](ω)−ε < c(z) < V♯[c](ω)+ ε. Since ε > 0, ω ∈ Ω were chosen
arbitrarily, we get V♭[c] ≤ V♯[c]. 
B A guarantee for V ♭ as a guarantee for W ♭ . The proof
of Proposition 1.
Step 1. Preliminary constructions and estimates.
Notice that U is bounded from above by a positive R.
It is easy to verify that ln p < p− 1 < p ln p if p > 1. To each natural number k > 2 , we
can assign a number p ∈ (1, 2) such that
1
k
<
ln k
k
< ln p < p− 1 < p ln p <
2 ln k
k
. (27)
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Fix such k, p.
Now, S is a subsolution, therefore for some Tˆ (k) > 0 , we have ( 14a ) : for all positive T , δ
with T > 2Tˆ (k), δ < T/2 , there exists a strategy AT,δ ∈ A such that, for all z ∈ AT,δ ,
UT (z(0))−
1
k2
≤
1
T
∫ δ
0
g(z(t)) dt+
T − δ
T
UT−δ(z(δ))
(23d)
= vT (z)−
T − δ
T
(
vT−δ(zδ)− UT−δ
(
z(δ)
))
. (28)
Moreover, by ( 15a ) , we also can choose Tˆ (k) such that
UT (ω) ≥ Up−1T (ω)−
1
k2
∀ω ∈ Ω, T > 2Tˆ (k). (29)
Fix such T . Define
λ ,
1
T
, δ ,
T (p− 1)
p
, τi , iδ ∀i ∈ 0, k.
Then,
T − δ
T
= p−1,
δ
T ln p
=
p− 1
p ln p
(27)
≤ 1, (30)
pδ
T ln p
(30)
≤ p
(27)
≤ 1 +
2 ln k
k
=
1
λT
+
2 ln k
k
,
ln p
δ
(30)
≥
1
T
= λ. (31)
Step 2. Constructing a near-wλ payoff.
Define a piecewise constant function ̺ on [0, τk) by the rule
̺(t) = p−i ∀t ∈ [τi, τi+1). (32)
Then, for t ∈ [0, τk) , we have t ∈ [τi, τi+1) for some i , and
̺(t) = p−i = p1−τi+1/δ ≤ p1−t/δ. (33)
Consider a lower game with the following payoff:
c(z) ,
1
T
∫ τk
0
̺(t)g(z(t))dt+ p−kUp−1T (z(τk)) ∀z ∈ K.
Note that, by Up−1T ≤ R , we have
p−kUp−1T (ω) ≤ p
−kR = e−k ln pR
( 27 )
≤ e− lnkR =
R
k
( 27 )
≤
R ln k
k
.
Now, by 0 ≤ g ≤ 1 , for every process z ∈ K ,
c(z)− wλ(z)
(33)
≤
1
T
∫ ∞
0
[p1−t/δ − e−λt]dt+
R ln k
k
=
pδ
T ln p
−
1
λT
+
R ln k
k
(31)
≤
(R + 2) ln k
k
.(34)
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Step 3. Constructing the strategy A∗ .
Remember that T > 2Tˆ (k) , δ = (1 − p−1)T < T/2 by choices of T and p respectively.
Then, ( 28 ) holds for some A = AT,δ ∈ A . Let us also note that, since the right-hand side of
this inequality depends only on z|[0,δ] , the strategy A from ( 28 ) can be replaced with arbitrary
strategy that could be represented in the form AT ⋄δ A. Now, by ( 30 ) , it is equivalent to
UT (z(0))−
1
k2
≤ vT (z)− p
−1vp−1T (zδ) + p
−1Up−1T (z(δ)) ∀A
′ ∈ A, z ∈ A ⋄δ A
′. (35)
Define
A∗ = A ⋄τ1 A ⋄τ2 · · · ⋄τi−1 A ⋄τi · · · ⋄τk−1 A ⋄τk A. (36)
Note that such A∗ exists in A by property (⋄) .
Note that, since the sufficiently large k were chosen arbitrarily, to prove the proposition, it
would suffice to demonstrate that
W
♭
λ(ω) ≥ UT (ω)−
(R + 4) ln k
k
∀ω ∈ Ω;
in accordance with ( 34 ) , this fact would follow from
c(z) > UT (z(0))−
2 ln k
k
∀z ∈ A∗. (37)
Step 4. Proof of estimate ( 37 ) .
Remember that p−1T = T − δ, τi+1 = τi + δ, ̺(t) = p
−i for t ∈ [τi, τi+1). Now,
1
T
∫ τi+1
τi
̺(t)g(z(t))dt =
1
T
∫ δ
0
̺(τi)g(z(t+ τi))dt
=
p−i
T
∫ δ
0
g(z(t+ τi))dt
(23d)
= p−ivT (zτi)− p
−i−1vp−1T (zτi+1).
Then, for a process z ∈ K, we obtain
c(z) = vT (z)− p
−1vp−1T (zτ1) + . . .
p−ivT (zτi)− p
−i−1vp−1T (zτi+1) + . . .
p−k+1vT (zτk−1)− p
−kvp−1T (zτk) + p
−kUp−1T (z(τk)). (38)
By ( 36 ) , for every z ∈ A∗ , we have zτk−1 ∈ A ⋄δ A ; then, thanks to ( 35 ) , if we take into
account τk−1 + δ = τk , we will obtain
vT (zτk−1)− p
−1vp−1T (zτk) + p
−1Up−1T (z(τk))
(35)
≥ UT (z(τk−1))−
1
k2
(29)
≥ Up−1T (z(τk−1))−
2
k2
.
Substituting this into ( 38 ) and accounting for τk−1 + δ = τk , we get
c(z) ≥ vT (z)− p
−1vp−1T (zτ1) + . . .
p−ivT (zτi)− p
−i−1vp−1T (zτi+1) + . . .
p−k+2vT (zτk−2)− p
−k+1vp−1T (zτk−1) + p
−k+1Up−1T (z(τk−1))−
2
k2
∀z ∈ A∗. (39)
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From ( 36 ) and τk−2 + δ = τk−1 , we obtain zτk−2 ∈ A ⋄δ (A ⋄δ A) for every z ∈ A
∗ . Now,
vT (zτk−2)− p
−1vp−1T (zτk−1) + p
−1Up−1T (z(τk−1))
(35)
≥ UT (z(τk−2))−
1
k2
(29)
≥ Up−1T (z(τk−2))−
2
k2
.
Substituting this into ( 39 ) , we obtain
c(z) ≥ vT (z)− p
−1vp−1T (zτ1) + . . .
p−ivT (zτi)− p
−i−1vp−1T (zτi+1) + . . .
p−k+3vT (zτk−3)− p
−k+2vp−1T (zτk−2) + p
−k−2Up−1T (z(τk−2))−
4
k2
∀z ∈ A∗.
Proceeding in the similar way, since it is always τk−l + δ = τk−l+1 and
vT (zτk−l)− p
−1vp−1T (zτk−l+1) + p
−1Up−1T (z(τk−l+1)) ≥ Up−1T (z(τk−l+1))−
2
k2
holds for all z ∈ A∗ , we now see that, for every instance of z ∈ A∗ , it holds that
c(z) ≥ vT (z)− p
−1vp−1T (zτ1) + p
−1Up−1T (z(τ1))−
2k − 2
k2
.
By τ1 = δ and ln k > 1, the relation ( 35 ) directly implies ( 37 ) for all z ∈ A
∗ , which was
to be proved. 
Remark 5 As follows from the proof, the strategies that protect an asymptotic guarantee U
for the payoffs wλ, can be constructed by rule ( 36 ) with the aid of the strategies A
T,h that
protect the similar asymptotic guarantee for payoffs cˆUT,h.
C A guarantee for W ♭ is a guarantee for V ♭ . The proof
of Proposition 2
Step 1. Preliminary constructions and estimates.
Notice that U is bounded from above by a positive R.
Consider a natural k ; we can map to it the numbers M > 1, p > 1 such that
k = M lnM, p , e1/M .
Note that 1+x < ex < 1+x+x2 for |x| ∈ (0, 1). By M > 1 , we have p = e1/M = 1+ 1
M
+ r
′
M2
,
p−1 = e−1/M = 1− 1
M
+ r
′′
M2
for some r′, r′′ ∈ (0, 1) . Then,
1− p
M
M(1− p−1)
=
1− 1
M
− 1
M2
− r
′
M3
1− r
′′
M
< 1. (40)
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By ( 15b ) , for k (and, therefore, M ) there exists T0 > k = M lnM such that
U pM
T
≤ UM
T
+
1
k2
∀T > T0. (41)
Since U is a subsolution, thanks to ( 14b ) , we also can choose T0 such that, for each positive
λ < M/T0, for each h > 0 , there exists A
λ,h ∈ A such that, for all z ∈ Aλ,h ,
Uλ(z(0))−
1
k2
<λ
∫ h
0
e−λtg(z(t)) dt+ e−λhUλ(z(h))
(23d)
= wλ(z)− e
−λhwλ(zh) + e
−λhUλ(z(h)).(42)
Let us fix such k,M, p, T0. Fix also some T > T0. Define
λ =
1
T
, t0 =
T
M
, τ0 = 0, ti = t0p
−i, τi = τi−1 + ti−1 ∀i ∈ 1, k.
Then, we have the following succession of equalities and inequalities:
p−k = e− lnM =
1
M
, (43)
λpi ≤ λpk = λM =
M
T
≤
M
T0
, Uλpi(ω)
(41)
≥ Uλpi−1(ω)−
1
k2
∀i ∈ 1, k, ω ∈ Ω.(44)
Let us also note that ti constitute a monotonically decreasing geometric progression; τi are
their partial sums, and
1− p
M
M(1− p−1)
(43)
=
1− p−k+1
M(1− p−1)
=
τk
T
(40)
≤ 1. (45)
Step 2. Constructing a near- vT functional.
Define a scalar function ̺ on (0, τk] by
̺(t) = e−λp
i(t−τi−1) ∀i ∈ 1, k, t ∈ (τi−1, τi].
Note that on each such subinterval,
1 ≥ ̺(t) ≥ e−λp
i(τi+1−τi) = e−λp
iti = e−λt0 = e−1/M = p−1 > 1−
1
M
, ∀i ∈ 1, k, t ∈ (τi−1, τi].(46)
Consider a lower game with the following payoff
c(z) , λ
∫ τk
0
̺(t)g(z(t)) dt+ p−kUλpk(z(τk)) =
1
T
∫ τk
0
̺(t)g(z(t)) dt+ p−kUλpk(z(τk)), ∀z ∈ K.
Recall that 0 ≤ g ≤ 1 , U ≤ R; now, for every process z ∈ K,
p−kUλpk(z(τk)) ≤ p
−kR
( 43 )
=
R
M
implies
vT (z)
( 45 )
≥
1
T
∫ τk
0
g(z(t)) dt
( 46 )
≥
1
T
∫ τk
0
̺(t)g(z(t)) dt ≥ c(z)−
R
M
∀z ∈ K. (47)
32
Step 3. Constructing strategy A∗ .
Note that, for every i = 0, k − 1 , we have e−λp
iti = p−1 by ( 46 ) and λpi < M/T0 by
( 44 ) . Then, by ( 42 ) , there exists a strategy A(i) , Aλp
i,ti ∈ A such that
Uλpi(z(0)) ≤ wλpi(z)− p
−1wλpi(zti) + p
−1Uλpi(z(ti)) +
1
k2
∀z ∈ A(i). (48)
Since the right-hand side of this inequality depend only on z|[0,ti] , the strategy A
(i) can be
replaced with arbitrary strategy that could be expressed in the form A(i) ⋄ti A
′. Thus,
Uλpi(z(0)) ≤ wλpi(z)− p
−1wλpi(zti) + p
−1Uλpi(z(ti)) +
1
k2
∀i ∈ 0, k − 1, A′ ∈ A, z ∈ A(i) ⋄ti A
′.
(49)
By property (⋄) , there exists a strategy
A∗ , A(0) ⋄τ1 A
(1) ⋄τ2 . . . · · · ⋄τk−1 A
(k) ∈ A. (50)
In view of τi+1 = τi + ti , for A
∗ constructed in this way, there exists A′ ∈ A such that
zτi ∈ A
(i) ⋄ti A
′ for all z ∈ A∗, i ∈ 0, k − 1 . Now, ( 49 ) implies
Uλpi(z(τi)) ≤ wλpi(zτi)− p
−1wλpi(zτi+1) + p
−1Uλpi(z(τi+1)) +
1
k2
∀z ∈ A∗, i ∈ 0, k − 1.
Finally, from ( 44 ) , we obtain
Uλpi(z(τi)) ≤ wλpi(zτi)−p
−1wλpi(zτi+1)+p
−1Uλpi+1(z(τi+1))+
2
k2
∀z ∈ A∗, i ∈ 0, k − 1. (51)
Recall that A∗ ∈ A and, for all ω ∈ Ω, we have
V
♭
T (ω) ≥ inf
z∈A∗∩Γ(ω)
vT (z).
Since M (with k = M lnM ) can be arbitrary large, to prove the proposition, it would suffice
to prove the inequality
vT (z) > Uλ(z(0))−
R
M
−
2
M lnM
∀z ∈ A∗,
which follows from ( 47 ) and
c(z) ≥ Uλ(z(0))−
2
k
∀z ∈ A∗. (52)
Step 4. Proof of estimate ( 52 ) .
For each z ∈ K , i = 0, k − 1 , one has
λ
∫ τi+1
τi
̺(t)g(zt)dt = λ
∫ τi+1
τi
e−λp
i(t−τi)g(z(t)) dt
= λ
∫ ∞
0
e−λp
itg(z(t+ τi)) dt− λe
−λpi(τi+1−τi)
∫ ∞
0
e−λp
itg(z(t + τi+1)) dt
(46)
= λ
∫ ∞
0
e−λp
itg(zτi(t)) dt− λp
−1
∫ ∞
0
e−λp
itg(zτi+1(t)) dt
= p−iwλpi(zτi)− p
−i−1wλpi(zτi+1).
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Then, for each z ∈ A∗, i = 0, k − 1 , we have
λ
∫ τi+1
τi
̺(t)g(zt) dt = p
−iwλpi(zτi)− p
−i−1wλpi(zτi+1) + p
−i−1Uλpi+1(z(τi+1))− p
−i−1Uλpi+1(z(τi+1))
= p−i
(
wλpi(zτi)− p
−1wλpi(zτi+1) + p
−1Uλpi+1(z(τi+1))
)
− p−i−1Uλpi+1(z(τi+1))
(51)
≥ p−iUλpi(z(τi))− p
−i−1Uλpi+1(z(τi+1))−
2
k2
.
Summing over all the intervals [τi, τi+1] , we get
c(z) = p−kUλpk(z(τk)) +
k−1∑
i=0
λ
∫ τi+1
τi
̺(t)g(zt) dt
≥ p−kUλpk(z(τk)) +
k−1∑
i=0
[
p−iUλpi(z(τi))− p
−i−1Uλpi+1(z(τi+1))−
2
k2
]
= p−kUλpk(z(τk)) + Uλ(z(τ0))− p
−kUλpk(z(τk))−
2
k
= Uλ(z(0))−
2
k
∀z ∈ A∗.
Thus, inequality ( 52 ) is proved. 
Remark 6 As follows from the proof, the strategies protecting an asymptotic guarantee U for
payoffs vT can be constructed by rule ( 50 ) with the aid of strategies A
λ,h that protect the
similar asymptotic guarantee for payoffs like cˇUλ,h.
D Tauberian theorem for differential games
Consider a nonlinear system in Rn controlled by two players
x˙ = f(x, a, b), x(0) ∈ Rn, a(t) ∈ A, b(t) ∈ B a.e. t ≥ 0; (53)
here, A and B are compact metric spaces.
Here and below, we assume functions f : Rn × A× B → Rn , g : Rn × A× B → [0, 1] are
1. continuous;
2. Lipschitz continuous in the state variable, namely, for a constant L > 0 ,
∣∣∣∣f(x, a, b)− f(y, a, b)∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣g(x, a, b)− g(y, a, b)∣∣ ≤ L∣∣∣∣x− y∣∣∣∣ ∀x, y ∈ Rn, a ∈ A, b ∈ B.
Remember that B(T,A) and B(T,B) are the sets of all Borel measurable functions T ∋
t 7→ a(t) ∈ A and T ∋ t 7→ b(t) ∈ B , respectively. Since the elements of both A and B
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are functions, not equivalence classes, hereinafter, in this section, all equivalences default to
everywhere, not almost everywhere.
Now, for each pair (a, b) ∈ B(T,A)× B(T,B) , for every initial condition x(0) = x∗ ∈ R
n ,
system ( 53 ) generates the unique solution x(·) = y(·; x∗, a, b) defined for all T . Denote by
Y (x∗) the set of all such solutions with x(0) = x∗ .
Consider a set X ⊂ Rn that is strongly invariant with respect to system ( 53 ) , i.e., let
x(t) ∈ X for all t ∈ T, x∗ ∈ X , x ∈ Y (x∗) . Define Y , ∪x∗∈XY (x∗).
Let us further assume the Isaacs’ condition (also referred to as ’solvability of the small
game’ [33]) holds, i.e.,
max
a∈A
min
b∈B
[
s · f(x, a, b) + g(x, a, b)] = min
b∈B
max
a∈A
[
s · f(x, a, b) + g(x, a, b)
]
∀x, s ∈ Rn. (54a)
Easy see that, for each positive function ̺ : R→ R>0 , it implies, for all t ∈ R ,
max
a∈A
min
b∈B
[
s · f(x, a, b) + ̺(t)g(x, a, b)] = min
b∈B
max
a∈A
[
s · f(x, a, b) + ̺(t)g(x, a, b)
]
∀x, s ∈ Rn.
(54b)
The goal of the first player is to maximize the payoff function while the task of the second is
to minimize it. Our payoff functions are the following: for each positive T, λ , for all (x, a, b) ∈
Y× A× B ,
vT (x, a, b) ,
1
T
∫ T
0
g(x(t), a(t), b(t)) dt, wλ(x, a, b) , λ
∫ ∞
0
e−λtg(x(t), a(t), b(t)) dt. (55)
Note that ( 54b ) for ̺(t) ≡ 1
T
and ̺(t) ≡ λe−λt becomes the Isaacs’ condition for the payoff
functions vT and wλ , respectively.
There are many ways to define a game and the sets of strategies for each player; for a very
well made review encompassing a large number of formalizations, refer to [48, Subsect.14,15].
The Isaacs’ condition not only provides the equality of lower and upper values; in addition,
it makes value functions independent of formalization of strategies [34],[48, Subsect. 14],[8].
For the definition of the value of the game, we can employ, for example the nonanticipating
strategies (see [46],[20]). Let A,B be the sets of all nonanticipating strategies for the first
player and second player respectively (see [48],[8, Definition VIII.1.1]). For all λ, T > 0 , define
the value functions V ♮T ,W
♮
λ as follows: for all x∗ ∈ R
n
V
♮
T (x∗) , sup
Q∈A
inf
b∈B(T,B)
vT (y(·; x∗, Q(b), b), Q(b), b) = inf
Q∈B
sup
a∈B(T,A)
vT (y(·; x∗, a, Q(a)), a, Q(a)),
W
♮
λ(x∗) , sup
Q∈A
inf
b∈B(T,B)
wλ(y(·; x∗, Q(b), b), Q(b), b) = inf
Q∈B
sup
a∈B(T,A)
wλ(y(·; x∗, a, Q(a)), a, Q(a)).
A variant of the following theorem was also announced in [29, 30] and proved in [31] with
the aid of nonanticipating operators [17],[18].
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Theorem 6 Let X be strongly invariant with respect to system ( 53 ) . Assume Isaacs’ condi-
tion ( 54a ) .
The following limits exist, are uniform in x∗ ∈ X , and coincide
lim
T↑∞
V
♮
T (x∗) = lim
λ↓0
W
♮
λ(x∗) ∀x∗ ∈ X
if at least one of these limits exists and is uniform in x∗ ∈ X.
The proof of this theorem will appear to be an immediate consequence of Theorem 3. Since we
only require the closedness of the set of strategies with respect to concatenation, we will choose
among the feedback-type formalizations. To make the references more convenient, take the class
of feedback strategies with perfect memory and perfect state measurement [33, Ch. XIV]; see
also [8, Definition VIII.3.1],[19],[34, Sect. 11]. For proof of identity between the values defined
through nonanticipating strategies and through feedback strategies with perfect memory and
perfect state measurement, refer to [48, Subsect. 14],[8, Theorem VIII.3.11].
Definition of feedback MM -strategies.
Definition 8 A map ζ : Y → B(R>0,A) is a feedback MM-strategy (feedback strategy with
perfect memory and perfect state measurement [8, Definition VIII.3.1]) for the first player if
1) for each t > 0 , x|[0,t] = y|[0,t] implies ζ [x]|(0,t] = ζ [y]|(0,t] ;
2) for all x∗ ∈ X, b ∈ B(T,B), T > 0 , there exists a unique Carathe´odory solution x(·) =
y(·, x∗, ζ, b) of
x˙(t) = f(x(t), ζ [x(·)](t), b(t)), x(0) = x∗, a.e. t ∈ (0, T ]. (56)
We denote by F the set of feedback MM-strategies for the first player. This definition
directly implies that a solution y(·, x∗, ζ, b) (on (0, T ] ) can be uniquely extended up to a
solution of ( 56 ) (for a.a. positive t ) from Y ⊂ C(T,X) ; therefore, we may take y(·, x∗, ζ, b) ∈
Y . Now, denote α[x∗, ζ, b] , ζ [y(·, x∗, ζ, b)] ∈ B(R,A) for all x∗ ∈ X, ζ ∈ F, b ∈ B(T,B) . This
definition is well-defined; moreover,
y(·, x∗, ζ, b) = y(·, x∗, α[x∗, ζ, b], b).
Feedback MM-strategies for the second player are introduced in the similar way. Assign the
set G of feedback MM-strategies to the second player; for each ξ ∈ G , for each x∗ ∈ X , for
each a ∈ B(T,A) , there exist a unique y(·, x∗, a, ξ) ∈ Y, a unique β[x∗, a, ξ] ∈ B(T,B) .
Thanks to the Isaacs condition, by [33],[48] for payoffs vT , by [8, Theorem VIII.3.11] for
payoffs wλ, the values of upper and lower games coincide; moreover, these values coincide with
the values defined by nonanticipating strategies. Thus, for all T > 0, λ > 0, x∗ ∈ R
n , we obtain
V
♮
T (x∗) = sup
ζ∈F
inf
b∈B(T,B)
vT (y(·; x∗, ζ, b), α[x∗, ζ, b], b) = inf
ξ∈G
sup
a∈B(T,A)
vT (y(·; x∗, a, ξ), a, β[x∗, a, ξ]);
W
♮
λ(x∗) = sup
ζ∈F
inf
b∈B(T,B)
wλ(y(·; x∗, ζ, b), α[x∗, ζ, b], b) = inf
ξ∈G
sup
a∈B(T,A)
wλ(y(·; x∗, a, ξ), a, β[x∗, a, ξ]).
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In particular, like in Sect. 2, we may now assume that one player announces his own feedback
MM- strategy (from either F , or G , respectively) and another, knowing it, selects a measurable
control (either from B(T,B) or B(T,A) , respectively).
Proof of Theorem 6. Reduction to the abstract formulation.
Since the function g depends on a, b in addition to depending on x , let us set
Ω , X× A× B, K , {(y, a, b) | y ∈ Y, a ∈ B(T,A), b ∈ B(T,B)}.
Moreover, the mappings vT , wλ defined in view of ( 55 ) correspond to those defined in view of
( 9 ) . Still, Γ(ω) = {z = (x, a, b) ∈ K | z(0) = ω} for all ω ∈ Ω. It remains to describe A,B.
For each ζ ∈ F , it is valid to define
Aζ ,
⋃
a∈B(T,A),b∈B(T,B),x∗∈X
{(x, a, b) ∈ K | x , y(·; x∗, ζ, b), a|(0,∞) = ζ [x]}; A , {Aζ ⊂ K | ζ ∈ F}.
We can define Bξ for each ξ ∈ G and the set B in a similar way.
For all T > 0, λ > 0 , define the mappings V ♭T ,V
♯
T ,W
♭
λ,W
♯
λ from Ω to [0, 1] by formulas
( 10a ) , ( 10b ) . Note that, since y(·; x∗, α(b), b) is independent of a(0) and b(0) , each of payoffs
vT ,wλ, cˇ
U
h,λ , cˆ
U
h,T (for all h, T, λ > 0, U : Ω → [0, 1] ) is independent of them as well.
Proof of Theorem 6. Verification of conditions of Theorem 3.
We claim that, for all ω = (x∗, a∗, b∗) ∈ Ω , T, λ > 0
V
♭
T (x∗, a∗, b∗) = V
♯
T (x∗, a∗, b∗) = V
♮(x∗), W
♯
λ(x∗, a∗, b∗) = W
♭
λ(x∗, a∗, b∗) = W
♮
λ(x∗). (57)
Indeed, for each choice ζ ∈ F by the first player, a choice b ∈ B(T,B) by the second
player determines the unique process (x, a′, b′) with x , y(·; x∗, ζ, b) , b
′(0) = b∗, b
′|(0,∞) =
b|(0,∞) , a
′(0) = a∗, a
′|(0,∞) = ζ [x](b). By y(·, x∗, ζ, b) = y(·, x∗, α[x∗, ζ, b], b), α[x∗, ζ, b] =
ζ [y(·, x∗, ζ, b)], this is equivalent to the choice of Aζ ∈ A followed by the choice of z ∈ Aζ∩Γ(ω).
Thus, ( 57 ) holds. Moreover, now, Aζ ∩ Γ(ω) 6= ∅ . This implies condition (P) for A . One
can, totally analogously, prove condition (P) for B .
We claim that condition (⋄) holds for the introduced families A,B . In view of the sym-
metry, we will only prove this fact for A. Fix ζ ′, ζ ′′ ∈ F, τ > 0. Let us define the mapping
ζ : Y→ B(R>0,A) piecemeal: first ζ [x]|(0,τ ], then, ζ [x]|(τ,∞) .
Assume ζ [x]|(0,τ ] = ζ
′[x]|(0,τ ] for all x ∈ Y. Conditions 1),2) from the definition of MM-
strategy hold for ζ under positive T ≤ τ because they hold for ζ ′.
Similar to ( 13 ) , for all τ > 0, x ∈ Y, b ∈ B(T,B) , define xτ , bτ as follows: xτ (t) =
x(t + τ) , bτ (t) = b(t + τ) for all t ∈ T. Note that, since f,B are independent of t , we have
xτ ∈ Y, bτ ∈ B(T,B).
Then, we can define ζ [x](t+ τ) = ζ ′′[xτ ](t) for all t > τ, x ∈ Y, i.e., (ζ [x])τ = ζ
′′[xτ ]. It is
easy see that this mapping Y ∋ x 7→ ζ [x]|(τ,∞) is nonanticipating because ζ
′′ is nonanticipating.
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Therefore, the map ζ is nonanticipating. To prove Condition 2) from the definition of MM-
strategy for all T > τ , note that, for an initial condition x∗ ∈ X at 0 and arbitrary b ∈
B(T,B) , there exists a unique solution y(·, x∗, ζ, b)|[0,τ ] of ( 56 ) , in particular, y(τ, x∗, ζ, b) is
also well-defined. In addition, because ζ ′′ is an MM-strategy, for an initial position at τ (in
particular, for position y(τ, x∗, ζ, b) ), for a control of second player, for every T > τ , there
exists a unique solution of ( 56 ) on the interval [τ, T ]. Then, 2) holds for ζ. Thus, ζ is an
MM-strategy.
Now, we have α[x∗, ζ, b]|[0,τ ] = α[x∗, ζ
′, b]|[0,τ ] , α[x∗, ζ, b](t + τ) = α[y(τ, x∗, ζ, b), ζ
′′, bτ ](t)
for all x∗ ∈ X , b ∈ B(T,B), t > τ ; i.e., {(x, a, b) ∈ Aζ | x(0) = x∗} = {(x, a, b) ∈ Aζ′ ⋄τ
Aζ′′ | x(0) = x∗}. So, Aζ = Aζ′ ⋄τ Aζ′′ ∈ A for all ζ
′, ζ ′′ ∈ F, τ > 0 , and condition (⋄) holds
for A .
Consider a payoff c among vT ,wλ, cˇ
U
h,λ , cˆ
U
h,T (for all h, T, λ > 0, U : Ω → [0, 1] ). This
payoff c is bounded and independent of a(0) and b(0) , therefore, by definition of the lower
values, for each ε > 0, for each initial x∗ , there exists ζ
x∗ with inf
z∈Aζx∗
c(z) > V♭[c](z(0))− ε.
Define ζ∗ : Y → B(T,B) as follows: ζ∗[y] , ζ
y(0)[y] for all y ∈ Y. By straightforward
verification of conditions 1)-2), it is easily proved that ζ∗ is MM-strategy. By the construction,
this MM-strategy is an ε -optimal MM-strategy for the payoff c . Therefore, for any ε > 0 ,
the lower game with this payoff has ε -optimal strategy. The proof of existence of ε -optimal
strategy for the upper game with this payoff for all ε > 0 is analogous. It remains to prove
that for all games mentioned in the formulation of Theorem 3 there exists a saddle point.
Remember that, by [48, Subsect. 14]),[8, Theorem VIII.3.11], for all payoffs vT , wλ (λ, T >
0) , the condition ( 54b ) for corresponding ̺ implies that a differential game with dynamics
( 53 ) and this payoff has a saddle point. In particular, its value functions are bounded (lies in
[0, 1] ) and continuous [8, Proposition VIII.1.8],[48, Theorem 11.4]. By [48, Theorem 11.4], it is
the same for the payoff ∫ h
0
̺(t)g(z(t)) dt+ S(z(h))
if the functions S : Rn → R and ̺ : [0, h] → R are bounded and continuous. Then, it is the
same for payoffs cˇSh,λ, cˆ
S
h,T for all h, λ, T > 0 and for each S = V
♭
T , S = V
♯
T , S = W
♭
λ, S = W
♯
λ.
So, each of the games needed for Theorem 3 has a saddle point.
All conditions of Theorem 3 hold. Applying this theorem, we prove the result of Theorem 6.

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